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The Analysis of 
Moral Man 

An Outline of the Conditions of Human 
Righteousness 



C. M. STEVANS 

Author of '^ The Morals of the Po'ets" '^^ Immortality and Happiness,' 
' ' The Ridiculous and the Sublime.,'" etc., etc. 



CHICAGO 

THE POPULAR PUBLISHING COMPANY 

Publishers 



19271 




COPYRIGHT, 1900, 
BY C. M. STEVAN3 



LC Control Number 




tmp96 025787 



Moral Science is, the systematic application 
of the ultimate Rule of right to all concep- 
tions of moral conduct. 



The Analysis of Moral Man 

SOURCES OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Not in Sensation. 

Sensation is neither an act, nor the knowl- 
edge of an act, but an involuntary experience 
consequent on personal relation to a sensitive 
organism, and to objects capable of making 
impressions on that organism. 

2. Not in Perception. 

Perception being a simple recognition of 
fact, can include only such facts as are capa- 
ble of being known by simple observation, 
that is, without comparison a.nd inference. 

3. Not in Judgment. 

The knowledge of an action as fact is one 
thing, the knowledge of that action as right 
or wrong is another thing. The former in- 
volves simple perception, the latter is attained 
only by comparison. 



4- The Province of Reason. 

Reason discovers the moral law, without 
explaining how this discovery has been pro- 
vided for or on what ultimate basis the law 
rests. 

5. The Moral Standard. 

History reveals an irregular development 
of the moral code, largely due to racial and 
cHmatic conditions, but due also to the sub- 
jective character of the moral sense. What 
was right to the Asiatic barbarian was wrong 
to the Greek. What was right to the slave 
was wrong to the philosopher. The ethics of 
the middle ages seem faulty to the modern 
mind. 



STEPS IN KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Perception is the first state or affection 
of the human mind. By this we gain all our 
knowledge of the powers and qualities of the 
material objects about us. The instruments 
of perception are the five corporeal senses, 
seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelhng. 

2. Consciousness, or reflection, is that 



notice, which the mind takes of its own opera- 
tions, and modes of existence. 

3. Abstraction literaHy impHes the separat- 
ing of one thing from another ; but, as a men- 
tal operation, it denotes only a partial con- 
sideration of anything. It is the act of con- 
sidering one or more of the properties or cir- 
cumstances of an object, apart from the rest. 

4. Attention expresses the immediate direc- 
tion of the mind to a subject. The distinct- 
ness of our notions, the correctness of our 
judgments, and the improvement of all our in- 
tellectual powers, depend, in a great degree, 
on the habitual exercise of this act. 

5. Definitions are usually distinguished into 
two kinds ; one nominal, or of the name ; the 
other real, or of the thing. A definition of the 
name is merely a specification of the object, 
to which a name is applied. A definition of 
the thing is properly an analysis of a thing, 
or an enumeration of its principal attributes. 

6. Analysis deserves a place among the op- 
erations, by which the elements of knowledge 
are acquired. Without this, cur perceptive 
powers would give U3 only confused and im- 
perfect notions of the objects around us. To 



analyze is nothing more, than to distinguish 
successively the several parts of any com- 
pound subject. 

Reasoning. 

1. Thorough information. 

2. Systematic demonstration. 

3. Logical adaptation. 

Reasoning is a process, by which unknown 
truths are inferred from those, which are al- 
ready known or admitted. The evidence, em- 
ployed in reasoning, is deductive, and is dis- 
tinguished into two kinds, which are, moral 
and demonstrative. Moral evidence is that 
species of proof, which is employed on sub- 
jects, directly or indirectly connected with 
moral conduct. It is not however confined to 
such subjects; but is extended to all those 
facts and events, concerning which we do not 
obtain the evidence of sense, intuition, or 
demonstration; and to all the general truths, 
which are deduced from observation and ex- 
perience. Demonstrative evidence is that, by 
which we trace the relations, subsisting among 
things, in their nature immutable, like the 
subjects of geometry and arithmetic. 

2. Judgment is an act of the mind, uniting 



— 9 — 

or separating two objects of thought accord- 
ing as they are perceived to agree or disagree. 
The relation between these objects is some- 
times discovered by barely contemplating 
them, without reference to anything else; 
and sometimes by comparing them with other 
objects to which they have a known relation. 
The former is simple comparison; the latter 
is an act of reasoning. The determination of 
the mind in both cases is denominated judg- 
ment. Every act of judgment is grounded 
on some sort of evidence. That, which deter- 
mines the mind in simple comparison, is called 
intuitive evidence; and that, which is em- 
ployed in reasoning deductive. 
External Conditions. 

1. Observation. 

2. Attention. 

Attention expresses the state of the mind, 
when it is steadily directed, for some time, 
whether longer or shorter, to some object of 
sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. 
When we say, that any external object, or any 
subject of thought, which is purely internal, 
receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as 
far as we are able to determine, that the mind 



— 10 — 

is occupied with the subject of its attention, 
whatever it is, for a certain period, and that 
all other things are, for the time being, shut 
out. In other words, the grasp, which the 
mind fixes upon the object of its contempla- 
tions, is an undivided, an unbroken one. 
Internal Conditions. 

I. Memory, 
Reproduction. 
Recognition. 

Memory is that power or susceptibility of 
the mind, from which arise those conceptions, 
which are modified by the relation of past 
time. It is not a simple, but complex state 
of the intellectual principle, implying, (i) a 
conception of the object, (2) the relation of 
priority in its existence. That is, we not only 
have a conception of the object, but this con- 
ception is attended with the conviction, that 
it underwent the examination of our senses, or 
was perceived by us at some former period. 

Memory. 
When good — 

1. Facility in receiving ideas. 

2. Power of retaining ideas. 

3. Readiness in reproducing. 



— II — 

Advantages — 

1. Furnishes comparison of ideas, the basis 

of judgment. 

2. Susceptibihty to remembrances is intel- 

lectual and moral. 
Means of Improving — 

1. Selection of lines of intentional memory. 

2. Correlation of ideas. 

3. Systematize and refer to general prin- 

ciples. 

4. Undivided attention. 

5. Thorough understanding. 

6. Congenial and serviceable exercise. 

7. Use accessories to thorough conception 

and comprehension. 
Means of improving the memory — 

1. Discrimination for the interesting and 

the useful. 

2. Knowledge classified. 

3. Full acquaintance and understanding. 

4. Exercised on useful subjects. 

5. Explanatory accessories associated. 

6. Writing useful in bringing the subject 

closer to the attention. 

7. Occasional mnemonics. 

The general principles or law of associa- 



— 12 — 

tion, which are sometimes called the primary 
laws, are these, resemblance, contrast, con- 
tiguity in time and place, and cause and ef- 
fect. — The secondary laws of association, 
which give such great variety to the results 
of the primary principles, are these; — (i) Dif- 
ferences in the length of time of the Co^ex- 
istence of the associated feelings at first; — 
(2) Their greater or less degree of liveli- 
ness ; — (3) The frequency of their renewal ; — 
(4) The circumstances of their being more or 
less recent ; — (5) The degree or extent of their 
co-existence with other feelings; — (6) Di- 
versities in temper and disposition ; — (7) The 
influence of particular professions and pur- 
suits; — (8) Certain constitutional differences 
in mental character. 

Ideas, 

Locke, having reference tO' the mode, in 
which our simple ideas are received into the 
mind, has divided them into the four follow- 
ing classes; 

(i) Those, which are received by one sense 
merely ; 

(2) Those, which are received from more 
than one sense; 



— 13 — 

(3) Those, which are received from reflec- 

tion or the observation of what takes 
place in our minds; 

(4) Those, which are received by reflection, 

and come into the mind also' at other 
times, in various ways, by the senses ; 
or which in some instances are received 
by sensation and reflection combined, 
and not separately, as in some occa- 
sions of the origin of the simple idea 
of power. 
Facts may be classified — 
(i). Original. 
Sensation. 
Consciousness. 
Self-abilities. 
(2) General. 
Self-existence. 
Conscious identity. 
Self-active abiHties. 
Reasonable discriminations. 
Fact, kinds necessary — 
As two and two are four. 
Contingent. 

The world exists. 
Facts in the mind — 



— 14 — 

Elemental — activity, intelligence, liberty. 

Universal — Being, diversity, identity, re- 
semblance. 

Causal — Cause and effect, motion, number, 
period of time. 
Substance and quality — 

Vitality. 

Personality. 

Objectivity — Whole and part, measure, 
space impenetrability. 

Aesthetical — Truth, sublimity, beauty, de- 
formity, ludicrousness. 

Ethical — Conscience discerns moral differ- 
ences, sense of obligation, reasonable 
duty. 



THE WILL. (THE FACULTY OF RESO- 
LUTION.) 

Volition is the origin of activity only in so 
far as actions are regulated by our intellectual 
powers. It is only the intelligent being which 
can contemplate, devise, and execute a fonii 
of activity purely subjective in its source. 
What we originate is achieved, in respect of 



— 15 — 

plan, by means of thought ; in respect of force, 
by means of will. Only such action as owes 
its form to intellectual as well as volitional 
power is properly named Self-originated. 
It starts, fixes, concentrates, clears and 

regulates the mind. 
It gives to self-determination a positive se- 
lection and a spontaneous action. 
It directs — 

1. To a definite object. 

2. To an alternate object. 

3. To the fulfilling of inner desire. 
It proceeds — 

1. By pre-volitional cognition. 

2. Emotion. 

3. Conscious responsibility. 
It has power — 

1. To resist constitutional nature. 

2. To us€ the means of environment. 

3. To shape self according to the judg- 
ment. 

Action is not free but the normal origin of 
action is free. 
Differences Between Knowing and Feeling. 
Feeling is a modification of self, knowing 
necessitates an outward impression. 



— id- 
Feeling is pleasure or pain, knowing is true 
or false. 
Feelings are — 

1. Fugitive. 

2. Variable. 

3. Intricate. 
Knowing is — 

1. Permanent. 

2. Invariable. 

3. Uniform. 

Intellect is strengthened and feeling weak- 
ened by familiarity and repetition. 
Cognitions may be recalled, feeling can not. 
Intellect can entertain opposite proposi- 
tions at once, feeling can not experi- 
ence pain and joy at once. 
Mind. 

Subjective — conceptions. 

Resolves into judgments. 
Objective — perceptions. 

Takes cognizance of externals, thus 
harvesting ideas. 

Responsible. 
Individual causation is proven by the at- 
tributes and functions of the intellect, sensi- 
bilities and will. 



— 17^ 

The conceptions of causality, afe in desires, 
duties, and reasons. 

This causality influences the conceptions. 

It may be classified into simple succession 
and its causes may be qualified as, mechanical, 
physical, vital, spontaneous. 

The ground for certainties in causalities 
are — 

The negative ones of chance and fate. 

The positive necessities. 

1. Individual. 

2. Absolute. 

3. Physical. 

4. Hypothetical. 

The possible and attainable. 
The criterion of right and wrong as 
to feeling is — 

1. Pleasure. 

2. Pain. 

As to reason is — ' 

1. Usefulness. 

2. Detriment. 
As to will — 

1. The possible. 

2. The impossible. 
As to the ideal — 



-— 1« — 

1. Personal perfection. 

2. Universal well-being. 
The responsible agent — 

As a personal agent, the individual is cre- 
ated an embodied self-active spirit. 

1. He has motives. 
For good. 

For gain. 
For revenge. 

2. He is an arbiter and executor by 
choice and volition. 

3. His guides are — 
Prudence. 
Conscience. 
Rational ideal. 

4. His moral nature is conscious and 
constructive. 

As a moral agent, the theorists classify 
themselves as — experimentalists, intuitional- 
ists. 

The requisites of responsibility are' — intel- 
ligence, conscience, free-will. 

Duty is a responsibility that is ethically nec- 
essary. Morality consists in deliberate self- 
submission to that necessity. Education in 



— 19 — 

moral life to the establishment of character is 
the most responsible of duties. 

Free agency recognizes — 

Free exercise in full maturity of mind. 
Mental health. 
Freedom from habit. 

Free from the necessity of conditions or cir- 
cumstance. 
Unbiased action within the limits of mind. 

Man exhibits his spirituality in — 
Cognizing. 
Volitionizing. 
Feeling. 
Hopefulness for immortality. 

The general facts of responsibility are^ — 

Man exists in relationships responsible ac- 
cording to his ability to know and to do. 

Through these relationships, the mind de- 
sires to achieve certain results. 

The dispositions of these desires may vary 
but the moral obligations due the rela- 
tionships are invariable. 

The belief in the indestructibility and evo- 
lution of mind. 

Ideals relating to perfection and happiness. 



— 20 — ' 

The determination of rules and means to at- 
tain ideals. 
These ideals are constructed in — 

1. Egoism or self-love; that is the greatest 
attainable surplus of pleasure over pain, 
pleasure being valued according tO' its 
pleasantness. 

The impracticability of the egoistic ideal 

is shown in — 
Transient pleasures cannot satisfy. 
The analysis and comparison of pleasures 

necessary to a choice is unfavorable to 

pleasure. 
Error in judging pleasures defeat their 

aim. 

2. Intuitionalism, the ability to see without 
education the conduct that is right and 
best. 

3. Education, a careful and balanced train- 
ing of all the faculties to a just apprecia- 
tion of the beautiful, the true and good, 
duty to be discovered by reason. 

Individual Education. 
Rights of the child — 

1. To be well born. 

2. To be well protected. 



— 21 — 

3- To be under wholesome influence, ex- 
ample and precept. 
4. To be well reared. 
Physically 
Mentally. 
Socially. 
Morally. 
Responsibility of the child^ — 

1. To the extent of its memory, under- 
standing, and capability. 

2. To the extent of its experience and re- 
flective faculties. 

3. To the extent of the wisdom inculcated 
by trusted advisers. 

Fundamentals of its training — 

1. It must be taught — 
Obedience to authority. 
Self-discipline. 

Care of health. 
Senses alert. 
Wholesome thinking. 
Righteous conduct. 
Correct expression. 

Inspiration for progress In moral excel- 
lence and usefulness. 

2. Its temperament must be understood. 



— 22 — 

Excitable or calm. 
Energetic or dull. 

3. It's disposition must be understood. 
Sensitive or indifferent. 

Careful or careless. 
Hopeful or sad. 
Sympathetic or unsympathetic. 
Kind or unkind. 
Leader or follower. 
Arrogant or respectful. 
Honest or dishonest. 

4. Is its perception. 
Quick or slow. 
Accurate or inaccurate. 

5. Is its memory of words 

(i.) Quick or slow. 
(2) Clear or confused. 
Of ideas. 

(i) Distinct or indistinct. 
(2) Orderly or disorderly. 

6. Is its imagination 
Strong or weak. 
Receptive or creative. 
Intellectual or emotional. 
Logical or illogical. 

7. Is its attention 



— 23 — 

Strong or weak. 
Voluntary or non-voluntary. 

8. Is its understanding 
Quick or slow. 
Permanent or fleeting. 
Independent or fleeting. 

9. Is its language. 
Broad or narrow. 
Exact or inexact. 
Plain or figurative. 

10. Is its will 

Weak or aggressive. 
Yielding or obstinate. 
Fluctuating or firm. 

Practical understanding is the surest means 
to wise conduct. "Give me an understanding 
heart" is the most ethical prayer children can 
be taught to utter. 

The child should never feel the need of re- 
sort to excuses, equivocations, and prevarica- 
tions. 

Children should be advised not censured 
whatever their failures if it is evident they have 
done the best they were able tO' know and to 
do. 



— 24 — 

The child as a pupil has the right to the 
best individual constructive training. 

1. Under conditions of — 
Bodily comfort. 
Favorable surroundings. 
At regular times. 

.With sufficient variety to prevent weari- 
ness and monotony. 

2. Through practical means — • 
For mental discipline. 

To become expert and efficient. 
To gain useful information. 
To attain the art and wisdom of success- 
ful conduct. 

3. By incentives to study, as in — 
Gratification of conscience. 
Desire for self-development. 

(i.) In well-regulated emulation. 

(2.) Curiosity. 

(3.) Love of approbation. 

(4.) To gain honorable position. 

(5.) To become an esteemed citizen. 

(6.) To fulfill the desire for knowledge. 

(7.) For moral culture. 

(8.) Worthy aspiration. 

(9.) To secure success in life. 



— 25 — 

4. By the 'development of cHaracter in 
The desire to learn. 

To have self-reliance. 

Perseverance. 

Attention. 

'Accuracy. 

Patience. 

Inspiring ideals. 

5. By such government as makes clear his 

duty — 
To himself. 
To his schoolmates. 
To school property. 
To tasks assigned. 
To the teacher, school officers, visitors, 

the community, and the people at 

large. 
The pupil should be taught to learu' — 

1. By trying to be interested. 

2. By striving to comprehend. 

3. By reflecting in order to remember. 

4. By giving close attention. 

5. By studying systematically. 

6. By using his knowledge profitably. 

7. By original investigation and thought. 
He should be enabled to realize the folly of — 



— 26 — 

1. Offenses against himself, as — 
Injuring his own property. 

Losing friendship by rudeness or dis- 
agreeable manners. 
Neglecting duties. 
Uncleanliness. 
Bad habits. 
Immorality. 

2. Offenses against companions, as — 
Destroying their property. 
Annoying and injuring them. 
Accusing falsely. 

Slandering. 
Enticing to wrong. 

3. Offenses against property, as — 
Destruction by carelessness. 
Wilful injury. 

Aiding and abetting injury. 

4. Offenses against teachers. 
Disobedience. 
Disrespect. 
Annoyance. 
Slandering. 

Deceit. 
Conspiracy. 

5. Offenses against the school. 



— 27 — 

Restlessness. 
Inattention. 
Laughter. 
Evil speaking. 
Insubordination, 
Neglect of study. 
Irregular attendance. 
Irreverence. 
Distrustfulness. 
Stubbornness. 
6. Offenses against society. 
Disturbing the peace. 
Trespassing. 
Boisterousness. 
Recklessness. 
Injurious influence. 
Profanity. 
Vulgarity. 

Neglect of the opportunities of life. 
Study is necessary for self-improvement — 

1. Mentally. 

2. Morally. 

3. Socially. 

4. Professionally. 

Study should be pursued with method and 
system toward a given aim. 



— 28 — 

Among the benefits of study are that it — 

1. Awakens thought. 

2. Arouses the affections. 

3. Excites interest. 

4. Makes firm and resolute the under- 

standing and will. 

5. Promotes beneficial pleasure. 

6. Defends virtue. 

7. Disciplines and develops the natural 

powers. 

8. Enlarges and liberates the mind. 
g. Civilizes the emotions. 

ID. Makes labor and life pleasurable and 
profitable. 
Discursive study should be avoided since it — 

1. Debilitates the mind. 

2. Makes opinion inaccurate and uncertain. 

3. Weakens impressions. 

4. Renders knowledge unwieldly. 
Sedulousness in study includes — 

1. Attention. 

2. Constancy. 

3. Firmness. 

4. Discipline. 

5. Composure. 

6. Success. 



— 29 — 

Knowledge derived from study does not In- 
sure happiness because of the limitations and 
imperfections of understanding, but it directs 
to utilitarian and substantial welfare. 

Rules for happiness formulated from inves- 
tigation, experience, and study may become 
stimulative and protective under the direction 
of custom and law. 

Personal Culture. 

The formation of character is the most ex- 
cellent constructive work of mind. 
Its groundVi^ork is in realizing — 

1. The value of wisdom. 

2. The need of education. 

3. The fundamental laws of duty. 

4. The value of moral obligation. 

5. The sacredness of human affection. 

6. The excellence of moral sentiment. 

7. The faithfulness of love. 

It's incentive is enlightened self-love as 
shown — 
I. In bodily welfare through — 
Physical sense. 

Exercise. '■ 

Action. 



_3o — 

Exhilaration. 
Dietetics. 
Hygienics. 
Cosmetics. 
Aesthetics. 

The general conservation and extension 
of physical strength. 

2. In intellectual powers through — 
The love of novelty. 

The emotions of — 

(i.) Surprise. 

(2.) Wonder. 

(3.) Astonishment. 

(4.) Admiration. 
The pleasures of — 

(i.) Memory. 

(2.) Genius. 

(3.) Knowledge. 

(4.) Intellectual dominion. 

3. In the desire for — 
Property. 

Social favor. 

Esteem. 

Power. 

4. In care for moral welfare as found in — 
Self-knowledge. 



— 31 — 

Sanitary science. 
Social science. 

Self-Culture. 

It succeeds by self-knowing and self-train- 
ing derived from the receptive and construct- 
ive ability of mind. 
It promotes self-possession — 

1. In society. 

2. In danger. 

3. In business. 

4. In desires, 

5. In passions. 

6. In amusements. 
It educates by — 

1. Practical study. 

2. Comparative observation. 

3. Social reciprocity in useful experience. 

4. Self-control. 

5. Self-direction. 

Its sources of error are in— 

1. Ignorance of facts. 

2. Unenlightened passion. 

3. Heedless habits. 

4. Self-deception. 

5. Unsystematic and desultory work. 



— 32 — 

The predominance of theological ideals may 
become — 

1. Superstition. 

2. Fanaticism. 

3. Heedless enthusiasm. 

4. Bigotry. 

5. Dogmatism. 

6. Persecution. 

It may find in benevolent religious ideals the 
most consecrated forms of — 

1. Veneration. 

2. DcA^otion. 

3. Gratitude. 

4. Trust. 

5. Moral fear. 

6. Piety. 

7. Faith, hope and love. 

8. Truth. 

Conduct in Relation to Self-Culture. 
Its origin is in the triple nature and constitu- 
tion of man — 
I. Animal (the selfish). 
Influences from mere animal nature gov- 
erned by the will. 
Happiness not worthiness, is its highest 
law. 



— sa- 
lts motives rest solely in the gratification 
of appetite regulated by expediency 
and interest. 

2. Rational. (The selfish and ethical). 
Discriminations made by reason. 
Supremacy its chief ambition. 
Desire amenable only to duty. 
Recognizes the beautiful and sublime. 
Capable of knowing self and determin- 
ing well-being. 

3. Spiritual. (The ethical and religious). 
Personal righteousness the chief duty, 

manifesting itself in — 
(i.) Benevolence. 
(2.) Spiritual exhortation. 
(3.) Worship. 
Its motives are — 

1. The instinctive ones of appetite; as — 
Hunger. 

Thirst. 
Desire. 
Love. 

2. Those natural to self ; asi — 
The evils seen in — 

(i.) Sadness and sorrow. 
(2.) Grief and anguis'H. 



— 34 — 

(3.) Resentment and anger. 
(4.) Fear and terror. 
(5.) Dread and despair. 
(6.) Shame and remorse. 
(7.) Hatred and revenge. 
The good known in — 

(i.) Contentment and satisfaction. 

(2.) Gladness and joy. 

(3.) Dehg^ht and desire. 

(4.) Complacency and hope. 

(5.) Gratification and gratitude. 

(6.) Friendship, love and truth. 

(7,) Antipathy against evil and wrong, 

4. In the knowledge that good is valuable 

in itself and therefore a proper motive 
of choice and action. 

5. In the necessity of choosing the least 

evil and the better good. 

6. In the consciousness of a connection and 

sympathy betv/een the choosing and 
the chosen. 
Its motives are most apparent in — 
I. The appetites; as — 
Hunger. 
Thirst. 
Air. 



— 35 — 

Sleep. 
Passion, 

2. The affections; as^ — 
Moral indignation. 
Complacent love. 

3. Benevolence; as — 
Moral love. 
Spiritual interest. 

It has forces moving to action from within 
and from without which the individual can not 
explain and may not control. The "good and 
sufficient" reason,^ can never be the criterion 
of moral conduct, as it is simply the judgment 
of an individual not responsible in his judg- 
ments for humanity. 
It should consider reputation — 
I. By avoiding — 
The appearance of evil. 
The occasion of censure or ridicule. 
The characteristics of — 
(i.) Vanity and conceit. 
(2.) Haughtiness and inordinate pride. 
(3.) Assurance and arrogance. 
(4.) Contempt and contumely. 
(5.) Affectation and hypocrisy. 
(6.) Censoriousness and envy. 



-36- 

2. By practicing — 
Hjumility and modesty. 
Honesty and charity. 
Emulation and ambition. 
Its interests are served best in the emoluments 
arising from — 
Sagacious compensations. 
Benevolent reciprocity. 
Patient industry. 
Ambition in Relation to Self-Culture. 
The pursuit of wealth is deleterious — 

1. It is a violence of right in its incentives 

of— 
Force and fraud. 
Deception and dishonesty. 
Circumvention and distortion. 

2. It induces servile conduct to obtain 

ends. 

3. It demands a mean compliance in order 

to obtain results. 

4. It fosters false professions. 

5. It necessitates the prominence of self- 

ishness and the neglect of personal 
culture. 
The love of power militates against personal 
culture when it induces — ' 



— 37 — 

1. Obstinacy and intolerance. 

2. Waywardness and bigotry. 

3. Churlishness and tyranny. 

. 4. Partisanship and unworthy ambition. 
Safeguards are found against the perversions 

of ambition in the predominance of the 

affections as shown by — 

1. Sympathy and gratitude. 

2. Patriotism and piety. 

The passions may prevent or ruin personal 
culture by the natural causes of — 
Timidity and heedlessness. 
Cowardice and excessive anxiety. 
Pessimism and despair. 
The passions may be emotions leading to self- 
enlightenment through — 
Contentment and patience. 
Resignation and fortitude. 
Forbearance and forgiveness. 
Faith, hope and love. 
The judicial ethics in personal culture are— 
I. Personal feeling by — 
Self condemnation. 
Self respect. 
Repentance. 
Humility. 



-38- 

Earnest aspiration. 
2. Social righteousness in — 
Love of good. 
Aversion to evil. 
Moral discernment. 
Practical righteousness. 
Divine righteoiusness. 
Remedial ethics follows judgment through — 

1. Association. 

2. Education. 

3. Theology. 

The chief personal duties 'toward personal 
culture are — 

1. Honesty. 

2. Industry. 

3. Usefulness. 

Culture indicates a. caste in human life accord- 
ing to^ — 

1. Cleanliness or uncleanliness. 

2. Aspiration or passivity. 

3. Sense or credulity. 

4. Morality or immorality. 

The chief personal duties toward success in 
the avocations of life are — 

1. Perseverance and method. 

2. Orig*inality and enterprise. 



— 39 — 

3- Prudence and dispatch'. 

4. Attention and justice. 

5. Foresight and veracity. 

6. Moderation and interest. 

The chief personal duties toward pleasure 
are — 

1. Simplicity. 

2. Chastity. 

3. Temperance. 

Personal Influence. 
Its general benevolence is found most in the 
social affections ; as — 

1. Conjugal and parental. 

2. Filial and fraternal. 

3. Domestic and humane. 

4. Local and friendly. 

5. Civic and patriotic. 

6. Constitutional and legislative. 

7. International and racial. 

Its special educative benevolence is found in — 

1. The relations of sex, age and condition. 

2. In economy. 
Domestic and civil. 
Political and national. 

Its closest affinities are shown — 

I. In religionary sympathies through — 



— 40 — 

SGrfatitude and adoration. 
Obedience and love. 
2. In the religious feeling through — 
Devotion. 
Fidelity. 
Sympathy. 
Faith. 
Love^ — 

Desire. 
Peace — 

Trust. 
Hope. 

(Joy.) 

Cheerfulness — 

(Gladness.) 
Aspiration — 

(Perfection.) 
Reverence — 
(Worship.) 
Right doing may have any one of many 
motives. No mystery when prompted by fear, 
dread of punishment, hope of reward, love of 
praise, pride, vanity, worldly prudence, con- 
fusion as to one's own interests, force of con- 
ventionality, or habit. Only when such mo- 
tives are wanting do we ascribe goodness. 



— 41 — 

Right-doing is outward, and means conduct 
looking at the well-being of others. Good- 
ness is inward, and means making the wel- 
fare of others our interest — ^joy in another's 
joy, pain in his pain. The springs of our ac- 
tion come to lie elsewhere than in ourselves. 
We say in effect : "Thy ill is my ill, thy weal 
my weal, thy ends are my ends." Goodness 
amounts to altruism, or otherness, which in 
turn implies sympathy. 
The foundations of morality, as given, are — 

Self-interest. 

Utility. 

Laws of nature. 

Laws of country. 

Conscience. 
The enlightenment from spiritual teachers. — 

The Scriptures. 
The m'oral motive is given as—' 

Pleasure against displeasure. 

Love against hatred. 

Moral love against passion. 

Happiness against sorrow. 
Moral love is the main source of faithfulness 
to duty since it preserves — 

Fidelity and justness. 



— 42 — 

Temperateness and courage. 
Moral love has its force in the recognition ol 
obligation — 
Obligation implies— 

1. A law. 

2. An ideal. 

Law and the ideal embody the science of 
duty. 
Ethics has its foundation on — . 

Truth, — that is, invariable fact. 

Love, — that is, enlightened help. 

The Psychology of Ethics is completed 
only by constructing a philosophy of all that 
belongs to our personality as Moral beings. 
Each characteristic must be looked at, not 
only apart, but also in relation to other fea- 
tures of our Moral Nature. 
The responsible steps in ethics are — 

Choosing and acting from choice. 

Action must be rational not instinctive. 

Reason and impulse have an object. 

Sensibility is the source of the conception 
of an object. 

The object and the means of attaining it 
bring into use man's moral notions. 

Duties and Rights are moral equivalents 



— 43 — 

resting equally upon the unchangeable war- 
rant of moral law as the universal rule of hu- 
man action. The ground on which any man 
can claim a right entitled to acknowledgment 
by others is exactly the ground on which by 
necessity he must own moral obligation. 

And the conflict of harmony and duty be- 
gins. 
Individual ethics requires— 

,The conservation of abilities and powers. 

The consideration of circumstances and 
conditions. 

Self-support. 

The best possible use of time and talent. 
Altruistic ethics are found in — 

Benevolent reciprocity. 

Desire for the well-being of mankind. 

Theistic ethics may be included in the su- 
preme devotion of mind in a system wholly 
material or human or Christian. It may be 
theistic reconstruction or theistic obedience. 
The chief theories as to the nature of virtuous 
action are found in — 

Utilitarianism. 

Perfectionism, 

Rectitude. 



— .44 — 

Standards of right and wrong — 

Moral sense. 
Common sense. 
Understanding. 
Rule of right. 
Fitness of things. 
Law of nature. 
Law of reason. 
Justice. 
Good order. 
Truth. 

Moral Philosophy is the rational explana- 
tion of our moral actions, moral nature, and 
moral relations. It is a science of the knowl- 
edge of moral distinctions, of the practice of 
morality, and of the existing moral system, 
or order in the universe. It is a theory of 
knowing and of being, but only of such know- 
ing as is concerned with moral distinctions, 
and only of being which is capable of pos- 
sessing and applying such knowledge. 
The theories of Morality usually given are — 

The theory of right to the exclusion of the 
ought. 

The theory of alternate right anH ought. 



The theory of ought to the exclusion of 

right. 
The theory of ought and right combined. 
A question of pleasure or pain. 
The impulse of desire. 
The authority of superiors. 
Ultimiate Moral Rule. 
Objective theories — 

1. Authority of the state (Hobbes). 

2. Revealed will of God (Descartes and 
Dymond). 

3. Interest in the nature of things — 
Fitness (Clarke). 

Truth (Wollaston). 
Relationship (Waylan'd). 
Beauty of good will (Edwards). 
The ultimate right/is immutable. Ultimate 
truths are not the product of power, but must 
themselves condition all exertions of power. 
Power does not make the principles by which 
all power must be judged. 

The ultimate right is universal. As in rela- 
tion to all ultimate truth, no one can appropri- 
ate it and say of it, this isi my truth; but that 
same truth will also be truth for every mind 
that looks into the same ground. 



-46- 

4- Highest happiness — 

Unrestricted selfishness (Epicurus). 
Moderation (Aristotle). 
Religious (Paley). 
Utility (Malthus). 
Benevolence (Dwight and Taylor). 
Subjective theories — 

1. Susceptibility to pride gratified by 
flattery (Mandeville). 

2. Inner reciprocal sympathy (Adam 
Smith). 

3. An inner sense of moral distinctions 
(Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Brown and 
Schlegel). 

4. Immediate intuition (Cudworth, Kant 
and Coleridge). 

Ultimate right is immutable and universal. 
Pure morality consists — 
Pure mindedness. 
Independence and decision. 
The personal duties of self-control and 

self-culture. 
The relative duties of kindness and re- 
spect. 
Pure morality co<ntemplates character and 
conduct solely in the light of the ultimate 



-4;— 

rule of highest worthiness, and approves of 
only such character and conduct as stands 
conformed to that rule. This is the highest 
good and the only motive to right action, and 
can admit of no other motive in co-action 
with it. If other than the end of highest 
worthiness blend in the conduct, the life is 
not purely virtuous. 

Moral sentiments which are in harmony 
with Conscience, are by consequence in har- 
mony with our whole moral nature. Disre- 
gard of such sentiments, indicates some form 
of moral disorder. 
Moral worth is shown in — 

The magnanimity of experience. 

The rational mildness of good breeding 
and modesty. 

The intellectual judgment giving — 

1. Power. 

2. Worth. 

3. Dignity. 
Moral expediency is in 

The development of conscience by — 

1. Gratitude. 

2. Sympathy. 

3. Resentment against wrong. 



-48- 

4. Shame in wilful error. 

5. Integrity and honor. 

6. Hope and fear. 

7. Joy and aversion. 

8. Hatred and love. 

All moral rights are perfect rights, irre- 
spective of their being claimed by the person 
or enforced by society. A moral right rests 
wholly upon moral law, and must be uniform 
as that law. Positive law may not attempt to 
enforce all rights alike, because all rights do 
not admit of being enforced ; but this does not 
affect ethical validity of any of the rights of a 
moral being. 

Moral rights are not self-exacted, nor can 
they be voluntarily surrendered. They are 
the necessary accompaniment of obligation 
under reign of moral law. They are as un- 
changeable as the nature of moral law itself, 
and the obligation which it imposes. 

The Philosophy of Morals must be as ap- 
plicable to the persons by whom I am sur- 
rounded as to myself, and must be capable of 
verification by them. But it need not be ap- 
plicable to other living beings around me, 
or capable of verification in their experience. 



— 49 — 

The virtues show their value in the improve- 
ment of manhood and womanhood. 
Intellectual — 

1. In the pursuit of truth ; as 
Sincerity. 
Impartiality. 
Concentration. 
Accuracy. 

2. In communicating truth ; as 
Truthfulness. 

Candor. 

Consideration. 

Prudence. 

Wisdom. 
Moral— 
' I. Egoistic; as 

Temperance. 

Self-respect. 

Industry. 

Thrift and honor. 
2. Altruistic; as 

Courage. 

The benevolence of filial piety. 

Public spirit. 

Patriotism. 

Philanthropy. 



— 50 — 

Politeness. 
Loyalty. 
Moral consideration may be divided into: 
Obligations — 

1. Right (Truth in action). 

2. Duty (Justice in conduct). 

The fulfillment of contracts and under- 
takings. 

The fulfillment of expectations arising 
out of the natural order of associa- 
tion and society. 
Sentiments — 

1. Approbation. 

2. Flattery. 

3. Vindication. 
Conditions — 

1. Probity. 

2. Usefulness. 

3. Virtue. 

4. Innocence. 

5. Penitence. 

6. Atonement. 

7. Moral excellence. 
Practice — 

1. Temperance. 

2. Asceticism. 



— 51 — 

3- Fasting. 

4. Sobriety. 

5. Purity. 

6. Benevolence (To cultivate affections 
and confer happiness). 

Moral conduct — 

The sense of obligation comes from the 

consciousness of causation. 
A responsible action implies power exerted 

with a free will and by intelligence. 
A moral action supposes a knowledge of 
effects and their relation to right and 
wrong. 
The moral quality of an action depends 
upon — 

I. The elements of intention as shown in 
the outward act, the conception of the 
act, and the effect of its communica- 
tion, but the design is the moral spirit. 
All moral actions, being the actions of per- 
sons, presuppose intelligent observation, and 
are carried out by personal determination for 
a definite end. Every moral action, therefore, 
is capable of being regarded in three relations, 
according to its origin, progress, and result. 
.With all these, intelligent self-determination 



-"52 — 

is concerned. A moral action, therefore, in- 
cludes motive, act, and end. As these may be 
distinguished from each other, they may differ 
in moral quality. The motive may be right, 
though the act is wrong. The end is the vol- 
untary purpose of the agent, which will com- 
monly harmonize in character with the mo- 
tive. 

That the moral quality is in the intention, 
is conceded from the fact that the consensus 
of man in criticism is a blame or a praise of 
intention; and, also, because we distinguish 
between the instrument and the intention. 
The intention is none the less blameworthy 
or praiseworthy from -accident or a lack of 
ability to fulfill. 

2. The intention may not necessarily be 
wrong, though its successful act is 
proven to be wrong. 

3. The intention may be wrong though 
its successful act may be right. 

4. The intention may be a sin though 
it may never become an act. 

5. Good intention, however, can never be 
an excuse for evil since the execution. 

6. Successful intention is as cause and 



— 53 — 

effect and is subject to the same ax- 
ioms. 

7. Acts without virtuous intention are, 
therefore, not in themselves possessed 
of virtue though they may be good in 
their effects. 

8. This does not imply that virtue being 
in the attention, therefo're, is a crea- 
ture of the mind. Virtue can be ap- 
plied only in the abstract as a conse- 
quence of conscience and moral law. 

Imagination is a conspicuous faculty of the 
mind, and is well known to every human be- 
ing of sane understanding. We are so con- 
stituted that we are not confined to mere 
realities; but we can conjure up a thousand 
representations and combinations of things 
which neAT'er had, and never can have, any real 
existence. This power is the fruitful source 
of many of our pleasures as well as incon- 
veniences; and hence its proper cultivation 
and guidance become of infinite importance 
to the well-being and happiness of man. 

9. Therefore, as intention is the index of 
the individual life and imagination is 
the expression in the mind of desire, 



— 54 — 

so, whatever corrupts the imagination 
or sets up an imperfect ethical ideal 
for the intention, is not only destruc- 
tively vicious but may be ranked as 
the common enemy of human happi- 
ness and welfare. 
Personality is the first requisite for philos- 
ophising. Where there is not self-conscious- 
ness, or knowledge of self, as possessing 
power for self-direction, under conditions of 
intelligence, there cannot be a philosophy 
either of our own nature, or of any other form 
of being. 

Personality is the basis of morality. Where 
there is not knowledge of self, as the intelli- 
gent source of action, there is no discrimina- 
tion of motive, act, and end ; and where such 
discrimination does not exist, there is no 
morality. 
The obligations of moral nature provide — 

1. That all wrong is outlawed and furnishes 
in itself no obligation but rejection. 

2. As man's relationships change, new ob- 
ligations are formed. 

3. Obligations and relationships may be 
inseparable, as in parents and children. 



— 55 — 

4- Insufficient intellect or conscience or 
love in no way alters the nature of 
obligation. 

5. The duty of investigation as to relation 
and obligation is a part of all responsi- 
bility. 

6. The feeling of innocence and self- justi- 
fication is in no way a proof of real inno- 
cence or justification. 

7. Nothing can affect the nature of an ac- 
tion or change its inherent right or 
wrong. 

8. Intellect informs us of relations, con- 
science of the obligations involved, and 
love makes the obligations desirable. 

The principles of moral conduct — 

1. Before an action requires decision as to 
its moral qualities, respects for the doubts 
of conscience and obedience to the 
monitions of justice are demanded. 

2. After an action, the only concern is how 
to make its benefits more complete or 
to remedy any evil it may have contained 
or occasioned. The mind should reflect 
impartially and be thankful for good re- 
sults. If mixed results are obtained, mo- 



-56- 

lives should be analyzed ; and, if the mo- 
tives or the means were wrong — 

Suffer rebuke. 

Make reasonable amends. 

Fortify self against a repetition of the 
wrong. 

3. The steps in the consummation of de- 
sign are — 

The fixation of a definite purpose. 
The discovery of the means. 
The use of the means. 

4. Reputation being not only the personal 
happiness and social capital of the indi- 
vidual, but also a valuable, if not a nec- 
essary, condition of success in Hfe, pub- 
licity should not be given to errors of 
action without a needful public benefit 
being in view. 

Bad motives can be proven only cir- 
cumstantially and are, therefore, not to 
be charged except under urgent need 
and for the most wholesome results. 

5. The truth necessitates candor in which 
there is no wilful untruth by suppression 
or expression. The unknown is not to 



— 57 — 

be uttered as true, and tEe truth must 
not be falsely conveyed. 

6. Protection of the innocent, charity and 
mercy must prevail, but charity to be a 
virtue must proceed from sincere com- 
passion and its performance must be 
sympathetic and prudent. 

7. The practice of resentment is — 
Incompatible with benevolence. 
Imprudent as to our own happiness. 
Injurious in all its relations and results. 

8. Forbearance and forgiveness is most 
wise because — 

Those who are unjust to us inflict harm 

upon themselves, and are fit subjects 

for our compassion. 
It is a noble and satisfying independence 

that can look with pity and charity 

upon transgression. 
The primary truth of reciprocal morality 

is to do unto others as we would have 

them do to us. 

9. Promises should be Icept as far as the 
altruistic principles of right prevail, be- 
cause — 



-58- 

It is agreeable to the fitness of affairs. 

It is conformable to reason and to nature. 

It is essential to truth. 

It is necessary to social faith and public 
welfare. 

It is the basis of all social contract. 

It is the first principle of personal obli- 
gation. 

10. The essential personal duties must be 
jealously preserved, such as — 
Self-respect. 
Self-control. 
Self-defense. 

Personal purity, which may be culti- 
vated by — 

(i.) Suppressing from the imagination 
all impure images. 

(2.) Avoiding amusements that sug- 
gest impure thoughts. 

(3.) Avoiding such literature, pictures 
and people as afford evil sugges- 
tions. 

Being busy with the fulfillment of 

ennobling aspirations. 
The personal devotion needed in 



— 59 — 

frugality and industry, and self- 
culture. 
II. THe conjugal affections are the most 
powerful natural influences bearing upon 
moral conduct- 
Friendship between the sexes should 
have no thought not contained in the 
moral purposes of social welfare. 
Mutual sympathy, usefulness, and affec- 
tion form the most potent bonds of 
marriage. 
Sincerity of demeanor and honesty of 
purpose are essential to wholesome re- 
sults in all social affairs. 
Intimacies between the sexes in mar- 
riageable relations should be devoid of 
all personal familiarities. 
In conjugal relations there should be an 
absolute union of — 
(i.) Affection. 
(2.) Interest and reputation. 
(3.) Parental devotion. 
(4.) Regard for each others relatives 

and friends. 
(5.) Domestic responsibilities. 
(6.) Mutual fidelity, chastity, for- 



— 6o— 

bearance, and care for the com- 
mon welfare, 

12. The appearance of evil should be 
avoided as far as possible in all things 
with the purity of life and the inspiration 
of home maintained in all the affairs of 
life. 

13. Honest conduct has its sources in — 
\ (i.) Prudent judgment. 

(2.) Careful information. 

(3.) Self knowledge. 

(4.) Conscience honored. 

(5.) The influence of moral love and the 
mutualities of home. 
Rewards in — 
(i.) The increasing merits and enjoyments 

of life. 
(2.) The admiration, esteem, and friendship 

of those who are honest and honorable. 
(3.) The fulfillments of practical and 

worthy ambitions. 
(4.) The satisfactions of an irreproachable 

and symmetrical Hfe. 

A harmonial growth. 

An example devoid of offense. 

An old age of safety and peace. 



— 6i — 

14. The misconduct of self should pro- 
duce — 

Self-reproach. 

Remorse. 

Reform. 

15. The misconduct of others should pro- 
duce — 

Solicitude and pity. 

Antipathy and protective estrangement. 

Judicious suspicion. 

Jealousy for justice. 

Resentment and anger. 

Never hatred or revenge. 

16. The results of conduct are self-record- 
ing in memory. 

The evil brings: — 

(i.) A feverish conscience.. 

(2.) Personal debasement. 

(3.) Social condemnation. 

(4.) Loss of prestige. 

(5.) Endangered usefulness of life. 
The good brings — 

(i.) A pleasing memory. 

(2.) A happy conscience. 

(3.) The evident esteem of good peo- 
ple. 



— 62 — 

(4.) The possession of wise accom- 
plishments. 
(5.) The peace of rational reflection. 
(6.) The satisfaction of life well lived. 
The building of character. 
The forces included are — 

1. Exercise and self-effort. 

2. Seriousness and decision. 
Sympathy by the common use of language, 

implies an interest in the welfare of others, 
and may be considered in two respects, being 
an interest in their joy, or an interest in their 
sorrow. 

3. Sympathy and tact. 

4. Candor and honesty. 

5. SimpHcity and ambition. 

6. Thought control. 

y. Cleanliness and respect. 

8. Self-possession and ease of manner. 

9. Sincerity and sociability. 

10. Promptness and directness. 

11. Earnestness and thoroughness. 

12. Etiquette and self-control. 

13. Kindness and charity. 

14. Refinement and choice companion- 
ship. 



-63- 

15- Politeness and dignity. 
1 6. Progress and optimism. 
Tlie forces of the excluded are^ — 

1. Insinuation and flattery. 

2. Slang and profanity. 

3. Sulkiness and obstinacy. 

4. Flippancy and excess. 

5. Low humor and fads. 

6. Envy and revenge. 

7. Excitement and superstition. 

8. Gossip and sarcasm. 

9. Temptation and hasty promises. 

10. Unwholesome influences. 
Rectitude as a theory of conduct and thought 

is accepted by the general consciousness of 
mankind as the primary element of virtue. 
The theories of virtue are involved in meta- 
physical speculations, but it is agreed that — 
Virtue is the right, the good and true, as 

vice is the wrong, bad and false. 
Virtue must conform to truth and justice as 

found in benevolence and wisdom. 
Virtue must have the approval of con- 
science and be the emulation of right and 
pure motives in order to conduce to the 
useful, profitable and beneficial, and to 



-64- 

produce the highest happiness and wel- 
fare. 
Virtues may be classified — 

1. As to general truth. 
Truthfulness and veracity. 

2. As to personal character. 
Uprightness and righteousness. 
Integrity and probity. 
Conscientiousness and honor. 
Genuineness and consistency. 

3. As to altruistic principles. • 
Faithfulness and constancy. 
Frankness and candor. 
Straightforwardness and good faith. 
Trustworthiness and incorruptibility. 

4. In a negative sense. 
Naturalness and innocence. 
Simplicity and guilelessness. 

5. As to duty. 
In time — 

(i.) Diligence and promptness. 

(2.) Expeditiousness and punctual- 
ity. 

Manner and method — 

(i.) Accuracy and correctness, 
(2.) Exactness and precision. 



-65- 

(3.) Strictness and system. 
(4.) Order and method. 
Education — 
Instruction. 
Culture. 
Discovery. 
Justice. 

Generally-^ 

1. Compensation. 

2. Equity. 
Specifically — 

1. Honesty. 

2. Fairness. 

3. Impartiality. 
Altruistically — 

1. Obedience and loyalty. 

2. Civility and politeness. 

3. Chivalry and courtesy. 

4. Urbanity and etiquette. 
As to merit — 

1. Respect and reverence. 

2. Deference and admiration. 

3. Veneration and awe. 
As to demerit — 

1. Just indignation. 

2. Proper resentment. 



— 66 — 

As to the good offices of others — 

1. Gratitude. 

2. Thankfuhiess. 
Wisdom. 

Generally — 

1. Judgment and discernment. 

2. Acuteness and discrimination. 

3. Acumen and penetration. 
As to preservation — 

1. Prudence and discretion. 

2. Vigilance and watchfulness. 

3. Forethought and carefulness. 

4. Circumspection and cautiousness. 
As to providence — 

1. Frugality. 

2. Economy, 

3. Thrift. 

As to education^ — 

1. Observation and attention. 

2. Examination and application. 

3. Study and reflection. 

4. Diligence and industry. 

5. Sedulousness and assiduousness. 
Benevolence. 

Generally — 

I. Charity and love. 



-67- 

2. Kindness and humane feelings. 

3. Disinterestedness and loving kindness. 

4. Self-denial and self-devotion. 

5. Tenderness and self-sacrifice. 
Altruistically — 

1. Sympathy and compassion. 

2. Pity and kind-heartedness. 

3. Liberality and generosity. 
As to faults in others — 

1. Forbearance and forgiveness. 

2. Mercifulness and indulgence. 

3. Leniency and clemency. 

4. Peaceablenes'S and peacemaking. 
As to good in others — 

1. Esteem. 

2. Regard. - 
Family love^ — 

1. Paternal. 

2. Maternal. 

3. Filial. 

4. Fraternal. 

5. Conjugal. 
Social love tO' — 

1. Servant and master. 

2. Friends and neighbors. 

3. Fellow citizens and countrymen. 



— 68 — 

Personal disposition — 

1. Good will and humor. 

2. Good nature and agreeableness. 

3. Amiability and geniality. 

4. Affability and graciousness. 

5. Obliging and benign. 

6. Complaisant and accommodating. 

7. Thoughtful and considerate. 

8. Suave and accessible. 
Self-control. 

In regard to desire — 

1. Temperance and decision. 

2. Determination and resolution. 

3. Fixity and tenacity of purpose. 

4. Steadiness and stability. 

5. Unchangeableness and earnestness. 

6. Energy and zeal. 

7. Ardor and fervor. 

8. Enthusiasm and self-conquest. 
In regard to appetites — 

1. Absteminousness and sobriety. 

2. Moderation and chastity. 

3. Continence and purity. 

4. Cleanliness and modesty. 

5. Reserve and consideration. 
As to control of emotion — 



-69- 

1. Boldness and daring. 

2. Bravery and resolution. 

3. Enterprise and valor. 

4. Undauntedness and intrepidity. 

5. Fortitude and heroism. 
As to healthy development — 

1. Cheerfulness and hopefulness. 

2. Confidence and self-reliance. 

3. Calmness and endurance. 

4. Collectedness and composedness. 
As to pride — 

1. Humility and lowliness. 

2. Diffidence and fractableness. 

3. Modesty and docility. 

4. Forbearance and independence. 

5. Nobleness and magnanimity. 
As to control of animal spirits — 

1. Soberness and quietness. 

2. Sedateness and tranquillity. 

3. Staidness and seriousness. 

4. Solemnity and gravity. 

5. Serenity and suavity. 
As to development of taste — 

1. Tidiness and neatness. 

2. Decency and decorum. 

3. Propriety and seemliness. 



— 70 — 

4- Fitness and suitableness. 
5. Becoming- and tasteful. 
As to control of temper — 

1. Gentleness and meekness. 

2. Mildness and tolerance. 

3. Indulgence and long-sufifering. 

4. Forbearance and patience. 

5. Contentment and resignation. 
Vice. 

Lack of truth — 

1. Generally. 

Lying and falsehood. 
Misrepresentation and perjury. 
Inconstancy and untruth. 
Error and mistake. 
Exaggeration and incoherence. 
Incongruity and falsity. 

2. Non-fulfillment ofduty. 
Unfaithfulness and treachery. 
Perfidy and procrastination. 
Dilatory and unpunctual. 

3. As to others — 
Vilification and reviHng. 
Calumny and detraction. 
Aspersion and defamation. 
Libel and slander. 



— 71-- 

Depreciation and disparagement. 
Scandal and gossip. 

4. In weakness of moral intention — 
Compromise and temporizing. 
Trimming and time-serving. 
Flattery and adulation. 
Paraside and sycophant. 
Fawning and servility. 

5. In weakness of character — 
Prevarication and equivocation. 
Evasion and ambiguity. 
Shuffling and quibbling. 
Cavilling and vagueness. 
Looseness and laxity. 
Indefiniteness and indeterminateness. 

6. As to plausibility — 
Speciousness and sophistry. 
Superficiality and shallowness, 

7. As to pretense — 
Double-dealing and hypo'crisy. 
Insincerity and dissembling. 
Feigning and disguise. 
Simulation and hollowness. 
Dissimulation and affectation. 

8. Involving stealth — 
Crafty and wily. 



— 72 — 

Artful and sly. 
Deceitful and cunning. 
Disingenuous and clandestine. 
Underhand and intrigue. 
Quiet and concealment. 
Secrecy and subtlety. 
9. Involving fraud — 
Knavery. 
Imposition. 
Dishonesty. 
Lack of justice. 

1. Generally — 

Unfair and unprincipled. 
Injustice and unreasonableness. 

2. Offenses against right — 
Affront and indignity. 
Insult and outrage. 
Coarseness and roughness. 
Bluntness and pertness. 
Rude and cross. 
Discourteous and uncivil. 
Impolite and obstructive. 
Impudence and injury. 
Interference and ofHciousness. 
Fussiness and busy-body. 
Impertinence and formality. 



— 73 — 

3- In personal government — 

Arbitrary and tyrannical. 

Despotic and severe. 

Strictness and rigor. 

Threatening and stern. 

Rough and dictatorial. 

Austerity and bribing. 
4. As to a subject — 

Treachery and sedition. 

Insurrection and insubordination. 

Disloyalty and rebellion. 

Revolution and lawlessness. 

Disobedience and disrespect. 

Unthankfulness and ingratitude. 
Lack of wisdom. 

1. Defective judgment — 
Ignorance and infatuation. 
Injudicious and short-sighted. 
Eccentricity and foolishness. 
Senselessness and garrulity. 
Talkative and loquacious. 

2. Disregard of harm — 
Negligence and remissness. 
Imprudence and carelessness. 
Heedlessness and thoughtlessness. 
Unwariness and inattention. 



— 74 — 

Inconslderation and forgetfulness. 
3. Disregard of comfort — 
Improvidence and waste. 
Squandering and prodigality. 
Lack of benevolence. 

1. Generally — 

Malice and malevolence. 
Malignity and cruelty. 
Selfishness and unkindness. 

2. As to distress and faults. — 
Insensibility of ruthlessness. 
Churlishness and illiberality. 
Sentimentality and implacability. 
Taciturn and unforgiving. 
Uncharitable and unrelenting. 
Harsh and merciless. 

3. As to social relations^ — 
Inhospitable. 
Inaccessible. 
Unsocial. 

4. As to disposition — 
Ill-nature and ill-will. 
Annoying and ungracious. 
Teasing and provoking. - 
Irritating and exasperating. 
Tantalizing and vexing. 



— 75 — 

Lack of self-control. 

1. As to want of energy — 
Indifiference and apathy. 
Coldness and letbargy. 
Indolence and idleness. 
Sluggishness and laziness, 
Listlessness and supineness. 

2. As to misapplied energy. 
Impulsiveness and caprice. 
Whim and humor. 
Restlessness and fickleness. 
Changeableness and variajbleness. 
Hesitation and vacillation. 
Indecision and pliability. 
Weakness and obsequiousness. 
Hurry and precipitation. 

3. As to ill-regulated will power — • 
Waywardness and wilfulness. 
Pertinacy and obstinacy. 
Perverseness and contumacy. 
Unruly and headstrong. 
Incorrigible and refractory. 
Unmanageable and obdurate. 
Callous and doggedness. 

4. As to ruined will power — 
Declension and degeneration. 



Deterioration and disability. 

5. As to appetites — 
Luxuriousness and voluptuary. 
Immoderation and intemperance. 
Sensuality and epicure. 
Gourmand and gluttony. 
Licentious and dissolute. 
Reprobate and profligate. 
Immodesty and immorality. 
Uncleanliness and unchastity. 
Lewdness and wantonness. 
Lechery and debauchery. 

6. As to mental desires — 
Avidity and covetousness. 
Greediness and avarice. 
Sordid and niggardly. 
Usary and gambling. 

7. As to the emotions — 
Audacity and rashness. 
Termerity and recklessness. 
Fright and dismay. 
Shyness and bashfulness. 
Sneaking and cowardice. 
Dolefulness and despondency. 
Melancholy and despair. 

Pride is a consciousness or belief of some 



— 77 — 

superiority in ourselves over others, attended 
with a desire, that others should be sensible of 
it. 

Self-conceit and arrogance. 

Dogmatism and vanity. 

Prying and presumption. 

Ostentation and boasting. 

Pedantry and foppishness. 

Supercilious and censorious. 

Sneering and overbearing. 

Dictatorial and domineering. 

Ridicule and mockery. 

Jeering and scoffing. 
Arrogance. This is the ostentatious as- 
sumption of superior importance, and thus ex- 
hibits the inflation of self-conceit and implies 
the contemptuous disparagement of others. 
Simply as a man, one has no prerogative 
above another. If moral qualities make one 
more excellent than another, it can never per- 
mit the virtuous to display it ostentatiously, 
and if any adventitious circumstances place 
one man in a higher position than another, 
that will never justify arrogance and assumed 
self-consequence. 

Meanness and paltriness. 



-78- 

Shamelessness and baseness. 

Venality and unmanlinesS'. 

Mistrust and jealousy. 

Envy and mockery. 
8. As to passions- 
Anger and wrath. 

Resentment and rage. 

Vehemence and violence. 

Boisterous and turbulent. 
Fear is a simple emotion of pain, caused 
by an object, which we anticipate will be in- 
jurious to us, attended with a desire of avoid- 
ing such object or its injurious effects. 

Sarcasm and satire. 

Irony and abuse. 

Dissension and altercation. 

Quarrelsome and pugnacious. 

Sourness and bitterness. - 

Pique and irritation. 

Discontentment and chagrin. 

Fretfulness and crossness. 

Peevishness and petulance. 

Harshness and asperity. 

Spite and rancor. 

Vituperation and scurrility. 

Insolence and rapacity. 



— 79 — 

Sanguinary and' brutlsH. 
9. As to mental ability. 
Awkward and clumsy. 
Unseemly and uncouth. 
Abrupt and rough. 
Fastidious and dainty. 
Squeamish and finicky. 

10. As to animal spirits — 
Giddiness and volatility. 
Lightness and flightiness. 
Levity and inconsideration. 

11, As to desire to comment — 
The sources of detraction — 

1. Unmerited prosperity. 

2. Idleness and impurity. 

3. Impudence and gossip. 

4. Levity and intemperance. 

5. Efifeminate complaisance. 

6. Caprice and curiosity. 

7. Rash judgment. 

8. Malice and contempt. 

9. Ingratitude and hypocrisy. 

10. Jealousy and blind zeal. 

11. Wrath and revenge. 

The inhumanity of detractors is shown in 
that — 



— 8o — 

1. It is contrary to justice. 

2. It spoils just judgment. 

3. It hurts reputation. 

4. It injures credit. . 

5. It causes hatred and ill-treatment. 
Conscience is that power of mind by which 

moral law is discovered to each individual for 
the guidance of his conduct. It is the reason 
as that discovers to us absolute moral truth — 
having the authority of sovereign moral law. 
It is an essential requisite for the direction 
of an intelligent free-will agent, and affords 
the basis for moral obligation and responsibil- 
ity in human life. 
Conscience in relation to conduct — 
Kinds^ — 

1. True ajid lax. 

2. Scrupulous and erroneous. 

3. Certain and perplexed. 

4. Clear and doubtful. 

5. Fixed and probable. 
As a monitor it includes — 

1. An active intelligent belief in right and 

wrong. 

2. A desire for the constant prevailing of 

right. 



— 8i — 

3. Peace in die right and unrest in the 

wrong. 

4. A belief in the ultimate profit of right 

■against the temporary loss of the 
present. 

5. Personal influence and effort for the 

right and against the wrong. 

6. Delight and faith in the final triumph 

of right. 

In its demands for right it regards^ — 

1. Benevolence and protection as to the 

injurious. 

2. Moral detestation of all wrong. 

3. Pity and consideration for all wrong. 

4. Reasonable means to reclaim the of- 

fender and at the same time to pro- 
tect society. 

5. Forbearance and forgiveness. 

6. Official justice. 

Its office is — 

1. A discriminating power which may be 

improved by culture and wisdom. 

2. An impulsive power restraining from 

evil and urging the good. 

3. A source of reproval and approval. 



— 82 — 

In the culture of conscience these are essen- 
tial— 

1. Enlightenment as to duty, 

2. Definiteness of purpose. 

3. Attention and discrimination. 

4. Brightened by good and not dulled by 

evil. 

5. Impulses and emotions not mistaken for 

conscience. 

6. Violence should never be done to con- 

science. 

7. It must be obeyed promptly. 

8. Obedience must be determined and per- 

sistent. 

9. Faithful consideration for experience 

and superior v^^isdom. 

10. In every failure must be repentance, 

Testitution and reformation. 

11. Thankfulness for help and gratefulness 

for good. 

12. The sources of enlightenment and cult- 

ure for conscience are in — 
Reflection. 
Careful meditation upon the excellent 

thoughts and character of the world. 
Earnest study of the problems of right 



-83- 

and wrong presented in literature, 
history and the current events of hu- 
man Hfe. 
As to the action of conscience it may be — 

1. Prospective. 

2. Retrospective. 

3. Instantaneous. 

As to function, conscience is — 

1. A moral sense. 

2. A moral judgment. 

Conduct and conscience may be affected by — 

The influence of those trusted. 

Circumstances that bias judgment. 

Impulses and emotions that exaggerate the 
object. 

Bodily conditions of health. 

Character, as distinct from nature, is an es- 
tablished order of disposition which by de- 
velopment gradually acquires strength, in ac- 
cordance with the rules of life most commonly 
acted upon. Its measure is found in the pre- 
vailing dispositions ; the standard of measure- 
ment, in the moral law. Character is, there- 
fore, good or bad, according as the reigning 
dispositions are in harmony with conscience, 
or antagonistic to its authority. 



-84- 

Heredity — 

1. Kinds — 

Direct, the child resembhng its parents. 
Reversional, the child resembling its 

grandparents. 
Collateral, the child resembling its uncle 

or aunt. 
Pre-marital, the child resembling former 

associates. 
Prenatal, the child's disposition affected 

by influences upon it previous to 

birth. 

2. Temperaments — 

1. Phlegmatic. 
Dull and sluggish. 

2. Sanguine. 

Hopeful and animated. 

3. Choleric. 

Irritable and passionate. 

4. Bilious. 

Morose and energetic. 

5. Melancholic. 
Dispirited and gloomy. 

6. Lymphatic. 
Enthusiastic and harsh. 

7. Nervous. 



-85- 

Excitable and vigorous. 
Education in general — 
In its general idea, it has — 

1. Nature. 

2. Form. 

3. Limits. 

In its special elements, it is — 

1. Intellectual. 

2. Physical. 

3. Moral. 

In its particular systems — 
I. It is national. 

In the passive state ; as — 
(i.) The family in China. 
(2.) Caste in India. 
(3.) Monks in Thibet. 
In the active state, as — 
(i.) MiHtary. in Persia. 
(2.) Priestly in Egypt. 
(3.) Industrial in Phoenicia. 
In the individual state, as — 

(i.) Aesthetic in ancient Greece. 
(2.) Practical in ancient Rome. 
(3.) Abstract in Northern Barbar- 
ians. 
2. It is theocratic, as — 



— 86 — 

With the Jews. 

3. It is humanitarian. 

For special calHngs, as — 

(i.) In piety. 

(2.) Philanthropy. 

(3.) Industry. 

(4.) Ambition. 
To satisfy public demands, as — 

The pubHc school. 
For ideal self-culture, as — 

(i.) Ethical societies. 

(2.) Literary clubs. 
For an enlightened citizenship for the 
masses of people, as — 

(i.) The Chautauqua. 

(2.) University extension. 

4. It is constructive through — 
The home. 

School. 

Society. 

Business. 

The impulses of — 

(i.) Theory. 

(2.) Observation. 

(3.) Influence. 

(4.) Experience. 



-87- 

Paternal government — 
The home — 

1. Sovereigns [father and mother.] 

2. Subjects [sons and daughters.] 
The family — 

1. Its origin in marriage. 

2. Its integrity and honor as conse- 

quential and imperative to its mem- 
bers as is the national integrity to 
the nation. 
The family — 
Protection — 

1. Encroachments. 

2. Prevention of disease. 

3. Cure of disease. 
Labor — 

1. Production and supply. 

2. Thrift. 
Social life. 
Education. 

3. Marriage. 
Choice should be — 

(i.) Free. 

(2.) Reciprocal. 

(3.) Considerate. 

(4.) Provident. 



(5.) Unalterable. 

The marriage bond is the only a<iequate 
acknowledgment of the biological and ethical 
laws appointed to regulate human society. In 
this alone is there realization ol the truth, 
that the family is the primary form of society. 
In accordance with the common obligations 
imposed by moral law, interpreted and ap- 
plied to the special relations of husband and 
wife, marriage impHes a mutual pledge to 
life-long, consistent endeavor to reach in 
family history a high standard of attainment 
in physical, intellectual, moral, and religious 
life. A lower ideal is unworthy of rational 
government of the social life. 

The commitment made wisely enough 

to be for life. 
Official sanction. 
Social ratification. 

4. Parents — 

Authority of father and mother con- 
current. 

They must protect, train and maintain 
their children during minority. 

The right and welfare of children must 



-89- 

be the prevailing consideration with 
parents. 
. Children — 

Prompt subjection and obedience to 
parental authority. 

Respect and reverence. 

Tenderness, consideration, and sup- 
port for parents in their helplessness. 

Disputes between children should find 
in parents an ever ready arbitration. 

Children chould receive all question- 
able information concerning life di- 
rect from parents. 

All personal affairs of children and 
youths should be under the advisory 
confidence and care of parents. 

The youth, girl or boy. 

As personal responsibility increases, 
ideas, conduct and personal welfare 
should become more distinct, defi- 
ite, and determined. 

In the progress of thought, observa- 
tion and experience, there should 
continue to be more well-directed 
concentration of effort, economy 
of means, and conservation of force. 



— 90 — 

An understanding of capabilities, 
value, use and limitations, is of the 
utmost importance. 

An appreciation of health and charac- 
ter— 

(i.) No other possessions can ever 
contain so much safety and value 
for the individual as those two 
conditions. 

(2.) They form the only substan- 
tial basis of happiness and success. 

(3.) They are the only satisfactory 
foundations of progress and 
achievement. 

(4.) Character is the solitary genius 
of every individual imperial over 
all the environments and every 
condition possible to life. 

The proper use of vocation and 
money. 

Devotion to the art and wisdom of pro- 
ductive labor. 

Discrimination and determination in 
the functions of love and will. 



— 91 — 

General government. 

State exists for the exercise of civil govern- 
ment. 

State makes the constitution. 

The individual is sovereign within the free- 
dom allowed by state. 

Service. Every man is bound to render 
that service to the state which in his circum- 
stances are legally demanded. He may not 
shrink from official stations, or military duties 
when his country calls. He must judge if 
higher claims clash with the commands of his 
country and responsibly act accordingly, but 
in a righteous call of his country to any serv- 
ice, no citizen may hesitate and delay with- 
out becoming immoral. No government can 
last which cannot control the services of its 
citizens. All disrespect to the state is a dis- 
grace to the man. 

Pure morality can never be the end of gov- 
ernmental administration. 

Civil law is the constraint of individual 
choice, by state sovereignty, for the end 
of public freedom. 

Civil law to be, the constraint of individual 



— 92 — 

choice, by state sovereignty, for the end 
lof public freedom. 
Necessity has no obHgation or law. 
The civil laws are inoperative in the midst 

of war. 
As political government involves a modified 
limitation of personal liberties for the purpose 
'of securing the common good, it is essential 
to its constitution and procedure, that it be 
acknowledged that there are liberties which 
men cannot, consistently with moral law, sur- 
render, and with which political government 
cannot interfere without stepping beyond its 
natural boundaries. If only there be protec- 
tion for the rights of all, and provision for the 
common good, there must be unfettered lib- 
erty of thought, utterance, and action. Politi- 
cal government becomes the bulwark of civil 
and religious liberty only by rigid acknowl- 
edgment of the limits of its own sphere. 
The nature of man indicates a necessity for 

restrictive and prohibitive government. 
Without positive law, society could not ex- 
ist. 
Sovereignty should not attempt action be- 
yond its own capacity for governing. 



— 93 — 

It should not legislate beyond the subject's 

capacity for obedience. 
It may not legislate in violation of pure 

morality. 
The authority of the state. Man must live 
in civil society, and this cannot be sustained 
without political regulations. The state, 
through its constituted authorities, legislates, 
and to this the citizen is bound in unquestion- 
ing obedience. 

Punishments must be impartial and only 

upon personal responsibility. 
Penalty should be reformatory as well as 

deterrent. 
Pure morality may be protected but not 

directly influenced by legislation. 
Original rights behind the power of civil 
authority must not be infringed upon; 
as — 

1. Equality in freedom. 

2. Unrestrained thought and belief. 

3. Freedom of conscience. 

4. Unrestrained action in all things not 
subversive .of public freedom or mor- 
ality. 

5. Innocent until proven guilty. • 



— 94 — 

6. Special privileges to none. 

7. No one the privilege to evade law. 

8. The criminal has no right to sympathy 
against law. 

The rights of government — 

1. It must have sovereign control of all 
property. 

2. It is the supreme proprietor of the 
soil. 

3. It must consider the morals and needs 
of its citizens. 

4. It should prohibit injurious practices. 

5. Sumptuary and sanitary laws are to 
that extent advisable and irreproach- 
able. 

6. The helplessly poor must be humanely 
provided for. 

It must endeavor to promote prosper- 
ity by inducing the conditions that 
afford opportunities for individual 
enterprise. 
It must eliminate, as far as its rights 
extend, such conditions as influence 
immorality and pauperism ; as — 
Prohibitory laws. Individual choices may 
demand complete prohibition in many cases, 



— 95 — 

on account of their contradiction to the public 
freedom, and in all such cases the state has the 
right to enact and enforce prohibitory laws. 
The very end of state sovereignty is to guard 
the public freedom against all particular en- 
croachment, and if it has a right to be, and to 
do anything, its right to restrain anything 
which infringes upon the public freedom is 
manifest. 

(i.) Destruction of the slums. 

(2.) Beggars and tramps sent to institu- 
tions specially provided to enforce 
thrift and industry. 

(3.) Vagabonds and idlers not allowed to 

congregate in public places or where 

their vagabondage may be encouraged 

by mutual example. 
(4.) An end of indiscriminate giving. 
(5.) Saving the children and bringing 

them up in conditions that stimulate 

self-activity. 
(6.) Enforcing pauper parasites to be 

self-helpful. 
(7.) Save the unfortunate and protect 

the innocent. 



-96- 

Revolution against government — 

Justifiable when public freedom is im- 
periled. 
Revolutionary persons begin the work at 
their peril. 

Law of nations — 

International regulations must be founded 

upon a basis of reciprocal benefit and 

pure morality. 
Treaties can not involve immoralities. 
War is righteous only when in defense of 

public freedom. 
Ideal law has perfect freedom as its absolute 

end. 
Ideal justice is that absolute desert should 

be requited. 

Axioms of truth in the determination of right 
and wrong for the individual, society 
or the nation must be^ — 
Clear and precise. 
Plainly self-evident. 
Never in conflict with other truth. 
Supported by universal instinct and the 
best consensus of reason. 

Human progress. 



—57 — 

Moral sense In regard to moral excellence 
is — 

1. Unconsciously utilitarian. 

2. Instinctively ideal. 
Universal conscience judges — 

1. Never by the act. 

2. Always by rank of motive. 

Human conduct is the result ol motive 
conceived in the idea of what is — 

1. Most enjoyable; as. — 
momentary pleasure. 

2. Most desirable; as — 
Revenge. 

3. Most conducive to success ; as — 
Deception. 

4. Wisest and best ; as — 

Benevolence and providence. 

The education of desire culminating in the 
establishment of character is the supreme 
moral and social achievement of the in- 
dividual. 

The education ol the conscience to rule ac- 
cording to the moral law of absolute 
truth, is the greatest achievement to be 
considered in the welfare of the race. 



-98 



METAPHYSICS. 

Metaphysics, a name originally applied to 
those books of Aristotle which followed his 
"Physics," and which his editors called "the 
books after the Physics." In modern times the 
word has been variously applied and seems to 
assume quite a distinct meaning as employed 
by different authors. With the Germans, 
metaphysics is a science purely speculative, 
which soars beyond the bounds of experience. 
The objects of this science are supersensual 
ideas, unattainable by experience, and the dif- 
ficulty of defining the word lies in the circum- 
stance that the very knowledge of the ideas 
sought requires some proficiency in the study. 
Hence to one altogether unacquainted with 
speculative philosophy it is almost impossible 
to explain the meaning of the word "meta- 
physics" as used in this sense. The very pos- 
sibility of a science beyond experience has 
been denied by a great number of philoso- 
phers, and many works called metaphysical 
should rather be termed inquiries into the pes- 



— 99 — 

sibility of metaphysics. Thus Kant's cele- 
brated work, the "Kritik der reinen Ver- 
nunft," is a mere inquiry into the possibility 
of a theoretical science of things beyond ex- 
perience, which terminates with a denial of 
such possibility ; and hence some modern phil- 
osophers have considered Kant as nO' meta- 
physician, but as a critic of the mental fac- 
ulties, whose labors were toJ)e the precursors 
of a new system of speculation. On the other 
hand, a work like Spinoza's "Ethics" is purely 
metaphysical. He assumes the possibility of 
^f^his science, and, proceeding from a number of 
T axioms, speculates accordingly. Those who 
deny the possibility of metaphysics deny even 
the right to assume any axioms as applicable 
to a sphere beyond experience ; and those who 
did assume them, as Spinoza, Liebnitz, and 
Wolf, were called by the Kantians dogmatists, 
in opposition to their own appellation of crit- 
ics. The great point to be established prior to 
metaphysical speculation is the identity, or at 
least the necessary concurrence, of thought 
and being. This once estabHshed, speculative 
inquiry may proceed, as the results of logical 
investigation must in such a case, of course. 



— 100 — 

concur with the nature of being itself; but the 
sceptics always deny the right of assuming 
such identity or concurrence, while on the 
other hand different theories have been 
adopted to prove them, such as those of har- 
mony between body and spirit, — of the non- 
being of body altogether, except as an affec- 
tion of spirit, — of an absolute identity between 
thought and being,^ &c. It may be as well to 
observe that the critical philosophy, which as- 
sumes nothing but the "I" or "ego," and the 
laws of thought (Fichte deducing even the 
latter from the axiom, "I am I"), has Des- 
cartes for its author, whose "Cogito, ergo 
sum," lies at the basis of most modern sys- 
tems. 

In England, the word metaphysics is usu- 
ally applied to denote the philosophy of mind, 
as distinguished from that of matter. This 
science treats of the association of ideas, mem- 
ory, and various phenomena of mind ; and as 
it consists merely in collecting facts and mak- 
ing inductions like any other experimental 
science, its possibility is nO' more questionable 
than that of chemistry or electricity. How- 
ever, Locke's "Essay on the Humian Under- 



— lOI — 

standing," as a denial of any source of knowl- 
edge other than experience, may be put at the 
side of Kant's "Kritik," as containing inqui- 
ries of similar nature, though the results be 
different; Berkeley's "Idealism" may be com- 
pared with the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 
Fichte and the Common-sense theory of Reid 
with the views of Jacobi. The philosophy of 
mind as an experimental science has been 
chiefly treated by the modern Scotch philoso- 
phers, among whom the late Sir W. Hamilton 
holds a high place. 



REASON. 

Reason, according to the common notion, 
is the highest faculty of the human mind, by 
which man is distinguished from brutes, and 
which enables him to contemplate things spir- 
itual as well as material, to weigh all that can 
be said or thought for and against them, and 
hence to draw conclusions, and to act accord- 
ingly. A man may therefore be said to pos- 
sess reason in proportion as he actually exer- 
cises that power, that is, reasons and acts ac- 



— 102 — 

cording to the conclusions or results at which 
he has arrived. In such expressions as "We 
have reason to believe such an account," or 
"He has no reason tO' be dissatisfied," the 
word "reason" does not signify the mental 
power itself, but the conclusion or result of 
the process of reasoning, in contradistinction 
to motives, which are never the results of 
mental operations, but merely outward cir- 
cumstances by which our actions are influ- 
enced. 

Thus far reason is of a purely practical na- 
ture, and Kant therefore divided reason (if 
we may venture to translate his word Ver- 
nunft by the English word reason) into prac- 
tical and theoretical. The latter, which is also 
called pure, ideal, or transcendental reason, is, 
according to him, the mind's power of produc- 
ing ideas a priori from its own resources, or 
the power of conceiving things and their at- 
tributes which lie beyond the sphere of our 
experience, such as infinity, the absolute, God, 
the supreme good, &c. How far our knowl- 
edge of these things can extend is shown in 
the work of Kant, entitled "Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft," or "Criticism of Pure Reason." 



— 103 — 

Reason, in its practical acceptation, forms 
ideas a posteriori, in as far as it derives them 
from a consideration and comparison of the 
phenomena of the external world, endeavors 
to discover unity in variety, and trace all phe- 
nomena to one source, a supreme reason, of 
which human reason is only a reflex. 

Schelling defines reason to be the identity 
of the subjective and the objective, that Is, the 
identity of the power which knows and that 
which It knows, which includes the knowl- 
edge of this Identity. As the orig-Inal Identity, 
says he, exists in God, or is God, reason is a 
direct knowledge or an Intellectual percep- 
tion of God, of whom no Indirect knowledge 
is possiible. Hence God and reason are essen- 
tially of the same nature; they are identical: 
God is in reason, and reason is in God. 



EVIDENCE. 

That which makes truth evident, or renders 
it evident to the mind that it is truth. It is 
generally limited to the proof of propositions 
as distinguished from axioms or intuitions. 



— 104 — 

Evidence Is of two kinds, demonstrative and 
probable. Demonstrative evidence is of such 
a character that no person of competent in- 
tellect can fail to see that the conclusion is 
necessarily involved in the premises. Mathe- 
matics rests on demonstrative evidence. All 
the propositions of Euclid are simply deduc- 
tions from the definitions, axioms being as- 
sumed and postulates granted. But In every 
matter involving the establishment of a con- 
crete fact bearing on human conduct, dem- 
onstrative evidence is not obtainable, and the 
mind must content Itself wilth probable evi- 
dence. Even in mathematics the premises are 
not concrete facts but abstract hypotheses. 
Probable evidence is as If one held a delicate 
balance In the hand, casting into one scale 
every atom of evidence making for a proposi- 
tion, and into the other all that could be ad- 
duced against It. According as the one or the 
other scale preponderates the proposition is 
accepted or rejected. Probable evidence may 
be of all conceivable degrees, from the faint- 
est presumption to almost perfect certainty. 

In Law. Proof, either written or unwritten, 
of allegations In issue between parties. The 



— 105 — 

following are the leading rules of procedure, 
(i) The sole object and end of gvidence being 
to ascertain the several disputed points or 
facts in issue, no irrelevant evidence should 
be admitted. (2) The point in issue is to be 
proved by the party w^ho asserts the affirm- 
ative. (3) Hearsay evidence is not admitted. 
Legal evidence is sometimes divided into di- 
rect and circumstantial. In courts of law 
parole evidence, that is, evidence by word of 
mouth, is that which is adopted, while in in- 
vestigations in equity written evidence by af- 
fidavit is required. Another division of evi- 
dence is into primary and secondary. The 
production of a letter is primary evidence; the 
effort to prove what the contents of a lost 
document were is secondary evidence. (Whar- 
ton.) 

In Apologetics. The evidence for the genu- 
ineness and authenticity of Scripture are ex- 
ternal, internal, and collateral. The external 
evidences are those which tend to prove, on 
the testimony of other writers, that the books 
were written by the persons to whom they are 
attributed. The internal evidence is the evi- 
dence afforded by reading the books them- 



— io6 — 

selves, and noting to what extent their style, 
subject-matter, and moral and spiritual tone 
afford evidence in their own favor. The col- 
lateral evidences are those brought from va- 
rious sources to supplement the other two. 



SOPHISTS. 

The race of sophists took its rise in Athens 
about the 5th century B. C, when Athens was 
a real democracy. From the necessity every 
man was under of pleading his own cause be- 
fore the dicastery, in any case before the 
court, whether as plaintiff or defendant ; from 
the political power which every citizen pos- 
sessed, but could scarcely exercise with effect 
unless able to speak fluently ; the teaching of 
rhetoric, or the arts of speaking and arguing 
logically, came to be in much request. The age 
was also a sceptical, and therefore an inves- 
tigating one. But though flourishing in Ath- 
ens, sophists and their teachings were not con- 
fined to that city, but extended throughout 
all the Grecian republics, and occasionally to 
the courts of tyrants. They went about 



— 107 — 

Greece discoursing and debating', and some- 
times educating the youth of rich and noble 
families. They were not, strictly speaking, a 
sect; indeed the name signifying only a wise 
or clever man, had been so applied from the 
earliest times of Greece; and Socrates, Plato, 
and other eminent men were all called soph- 
ists. 

The disrepute attached to the name arose ap- 
parently from the facts of the teachers accept- 
ing payment for their lessons, and thence pro- 
ceeding to inculcate not the desire for truth, 
but the means of securing victory by the use 
of specious fallacies. It was against both these 
modes that Socrates and Plato contended; 
and to which Plato and Aristotle affixed the 
name as a term of reproach for a "man who 
employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the 
purpose of deceit and of getting money." But 
the sophists were able to bear up against the 
judgment of philosophers, by having become 
the trainers of men for the active pursuits of 
life, and their influence oyer the multitude 
greatly exceeded that of the sages. Nor did 
they all, though they taught for money, teach 
fallacies merely; and the representations of 



— io8 — 

them in the Dialogues of Plato must not be 
accepted as the truth with reference to them 
as a class. Socrates, Protagoras, and Prodi- 
cus, were stigmatized as sophists, but what we 
know of their doctrines and practice does not 
deserve any heavy condemnation. No doubt, 
in numerous instances the sophists, like the 
schoolmen of the middle ages, indulged in 
subtleties and evasions which were dishonest, 
trivial, and often ridiculous; but, as Ritter 
says, "It is not to be denied that the sophists 
contributed greatly to the perfection of prose; 
which was in itself a great benefit to philos- 
ophy. The sophists applied themselves to 
manifold arts of persuasion, and in their at- 
tacks upon each other, la'Boring to expose and 
lay bare the delusions O'f appearance, they ac- 
quired great nicety in the distinction of terms. 
Prodicus was celebrated for his skill in the dis- 
tinctions, of synonymou-S terms, as we learn 
from Plato, who ridicules him for it, but Pro- 
dicus is honorably mentioned by him. The 
sophisms turning upon the words 'to learn,' 
'to understand,' 'to know,' also contributed to 
the more accurate knowledge of these terms. 
The very circumstance that their rules were 



' — 109 — 

intended to be subservient to the ends of fal- 
lacy and deception, must have afforded a 
stronger motive to the philosophical spirit to 
bring under investigation the true forms of 
thought and expression which had been neg- 
lected by earlier philosophers; and accord- 
ingly we find that they occupied much of the 
attention of Socrates." 



SOPHISM. 

Sophism, that superficial and incomplete 
aspect of the truth, which at first sight looks 
like the truth, but on closer inspection turns 
out to contain some radical error. This seems 
the most correct definition, but the word is 
used loosely. Its general signification, nam'ely, 
a specious proposition, is perhaps nearest the 
mark. Truly considered, most errors are soph- 
isms, for errors are not direct contradictions 
to the truth, but simply the leaving out of 
view one or more elements of the truth, and 
seizing on only one or two elements, and de- 
claring them to constitute the whole truth.' 
Victor Cousin defines error to be "One ele- 



— no— ' 

ment of thougfht considered exclusively, and 
taken for the complete thought itself. Error 
is nothing but an incomplete truth converted 
into an absolute truth." Spinoza had before 
defined ''falsity to be that privation of truth 
which arises from inadequate ideas." It is 
sometimes a mere confusion of terms; as in 
the common example of — Bread being better 
than paradise; because bread is better than 
nothing, and nothing is better than paradise — 
the confusion arises from both the "nothings" 
being used substantively; whereas it is only 
the first that is so used; the second is affirm- 
ative, and expresses "there is nothing bet- 
ter." A sophism is therefore the use of some 
word in a different sense in the premises from 
that in the conclusion, and this is the defini- 
tion of Aristotle: "When the discourse is a 
demonstration of anything, if it contain any- 
thing which has no relation tO' the conclusion, 
there will be no syllogism; and if there appear 
to be one, it will be a sophism, and not a dem- 
onstration." 

This confusion o'f words and ideas is the or- 
igin of all errors and sophisms; but though 
errors and sophisms are logically constituted 



— Ill — 

alike, yet the instinctive sense of mankind 
marks the difference between incomplete 
views (error) and wilful perversion (sophism). 
In all cases a sophism is supposed to be rec- 
ognized as such by the sophist. It is an en- 
deavor on his part to "make the worse appear 
the better reason." It is the consciousness 
then of the sophist which distinguishes and 
renders odious his error as a sophism. 



SPINOZISM. 

The monistic system of Baruch Despinosa 
(or Benedictus de Spinoza), a descendant of 
Portuguese Jews who had sought refuge in 
Holland from the cruelties of the Inquisition. 
He was born at Amsterdam (Nov. 24, 1632), 
and his father, an honorable, but not very 
wealthy merchant, intended him for a theo- 
logical career. His education was superin- 
tended by the Talmudist Saul Levi Morteira, 
but unsatisfied doubts kept him from the pro- 
fession of a Jewish teacher, and his determined 
and continued refusal to attend the Syna- 
gogue gave such offence that in 1656 he was 



— 112 — 

solemnly excommunicated. For a short time 
Spinoza became an assistant in a school kept 
by a physician named Vanden Ende, but he 
soon resigned this post and afterwards main- 
tained himself by the art of polishing lenses, 
which, in accordance with the Jewish custom 
of teaching every boy some trade or handi- 
craft, he had learnt in his youth, though this 
source of income was afterwards increased by 
a small annuity settled on him by his friend 
de Vries. After a life of study, abstemious- 
ness and bodily and mental suffering, Spinoza 
died at the Hague (Feb, 21, 1677), at the age 
o>f forty-four. The system of Spinoza has been 
described as Atheism, as Pantheism, and as 
the most rigid Monotheism, according as his 
cardinal teaching — that there is only One 
Substance, God — has been interpreted. By 
Substance, however, Spinoza meant the un- 
derlying reality and ever-living existence^ and 
he chose for the epigraph of his Ethics the 
words of St. Paul : "In Him we live, and move, 
and have our being" (Acts XVH. 28). God is 
for him the one principle, having Thought 
and Extension as two eternal and infinite at- 
tributes constituting its essence, of which at- 



— US- 
tributes Mind and Matter are the necessary 
manifestations; and thus he solves the prob- 
lem of the relation of the Finite to the Infi- 
nite. Everything is a form of the ever-living 
existence, the Substance, God, which is, and is 
not. Nature, with which He is no more to be 
confounded than the fountain with the rivulet 
or eternity wiith time. God is natura naturans, 
Nature is natura naturata; the one is the en- 
ergy, the other is the act. In the same way 
he explains the union of the soul with the 
body, Man is but a mode of the Divine Ex- 
istence ; his mind a spark of the Divine Flame, 
his body a mode of the Infinite existence. 



SOCRATIC-PHILOSOPHY. 

A term sometimes used to include the de- 
velopment of Greek philosophy from the time 
O'f Socrates tO' the rise of the Neoplatonists, 
because, with the exceptions of the Epicu- 
reans, the chief philosophical schools up to 
that period professed to ground their teach- 
ings on the authority of Socrates. 

The ethics of Socrates, as gathered from 



— 114 — 

the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aris- 
totle. It is not known when Socrates com- 
menced his career as a public teacher, but he 
first attracted notice as an opponent of the 
Sophists, and was about forty-six years ol age 
when Aristophanes introduced him on the 
stage in The Clouds, strange to say, in the 
character of a Sophist. All previous philoso- 
phers had been occupied with the Universe 
as a whole ; the chief business of Socrates was 
with man as a moral being. His reforming 
tendencies made many enemies. In B. C. 
399 Meletus, a leather-seller, seconded by 
Anytus, a poet, and Lycon, a rhetor, preferred 
this indictment against him: "Socrates is 
guilty oi reviling the gods acknowledged by 
the State, and of preaching new gods; more- 
over he is guilty of corrupting the youth." He 
was tried and condemned to death, and, re- 
fusing the means of escape provided by his 
friends, drank the fatal hemlock in the seven- 
tieth year of his age. Bishop Blomfield 
(Ency. Metrop., s. v. Socrates) says: "Socra- 
tes taught that the divine attributes might be 
inferred from the works of creation. He main- 
tained the omniscience, ulbiquity, and prov- 



— 115 — 

idence of the Deity; and, from the existence 
of conscience in the human breast, he inferred 
that man is a moral agent, the object of re- 
ward and punishment ; and that the great dis- 
tinction O'f virtue and vice was ordained by 
the Deity," 



CYNICS. 

Cynics, the name of a sect of Greek philos- 
ophers who were produced by the school of 
Socrates, and were so called according to one 
interpretation of the word from their snarling 
disposition, though it is possible that the name 
may have been derived from the gymnasium 
called Cynosarges, in which Antisthenes, the 
founder of this school, used tO' lecture. Their 
doctrines were the exact opposite of those of 
the Cyrenaics, who were also an offshoot of 
the Socratic philosophy. They held that vir- 
tue was not only the highest but the only ob- 
ject at which men ought to aim, and that most 
of the sciences and arts, as they do not tend 
to make men virtuous. But sometimes on the 
contrary interfere with the attainment of it, 



— lie- 
are unprofitable and pernicious. Tlie true 
philosopher, according to their notions, was 
he who could discard all the comforts and 
charities of hfe and triumph over his bodily 
wants, so as to he enabled to live only for vir- 
tue without any interruptions either to the 
contemplation or the practice of it. The re- 
sult of these principles was great strictness of 
morals, and voluntary penances worthy of the 
fanaticism of an eastern dervise; and as long 
as these characteristics were coupled with 
ability in the professors and consistent phil- 
osophy in what they taught, the sect main- 
tained its place by the side of other philo- 
sophical systems, and some members of it, for 
instance Antisthenes and Diogenes, deserved 
and o'btained great celebrity. At length, how- 
ever, the morality of the Cynics degenerated 
into the most shameless profligacy, and they 
became so disgusting from their impudence, 
dirty habits, and begging, that they ceased to 
be regarded with any respect, and the sect 
dwindled away into obscurity. Of their spec- 
ulative opinions we know very little: indeed 
it does not appear that they had any theories, 
except on the science of logic. The great 



— 117 — 

merit ol the Cynic philosophy was that it 
paved the way for the estabhshment of Stoic- 
ism, which succeeded and superseded it, just 
as the philosophy of Epicurus supplanted that 
of Aristippus. The connection of this school 
with the philosophy of Socrates appears to 
have consisted in their developing the idea 
of science as applied to morality (to which ob- 
ject the labors of Socrates were mainly di- 
rected), but they did so to the exclusion of all 
those other principles which Socrates ad- 
mitted as useful adjuncts, and his sneers at the 
austerity and affected negligence of Antis- 
thenes may be taken as a proof of the low 
opinion which he entertained of this narrow 
application of his doctrines. The classical 
reader will find in Lucian's ''Cynicus" an at- 
tempt to justify some of the peculiar views 
of this school, especially in regard to their 
neglect of the conveniences of life, though it 
is not to be supposed that Lucian was inclined 
to the Cynical philosophy, for he elsewhere 
ridicules it. 



— ii8 — 



CYRENAICS. 

Cyrenaics, a school of philosophers among 
the Greeks, who derived their name from the 
birth-place of their founder, Aristippus, Like 
the Cynics, their doctrines were a partial de- 
velopment of those of Socrates ; but the view 
they took of their predecessor's philosophy 
was quite different from the Cynical. The 
only particular in which the two sects agreed 
with the original system and with one another 
was that they all three made virtue consist 
in knowledge; in other words they were all 
three attempts to awaken and develop the 
idea of science; but while the Cynics con- 
sidered all sublunary enjoyment and most 
branches o'f knowledge as impediments to the 
knowledge, and consequently, according to 
Socrates, to the practice, of virtue, the Cyre- 
naics, on the other hand, were not contented 
with the mere knowledge of the good as a 
general term, but sought for it in the separate 
particulars, and deemed him to have per- 
formed his proper functions most consistently 



— 119 — 

with his nature who had succeeded in amass- 
ing the greatest number of particular good 
things. In regard to the idea of science, they 
did not look upon it as a speculative concep- 
tion, but as a merely empirical result, as the 
aggregation of successive experiences; in 
other words, not as an intuition but as a com- 
bination of perceptions ; and while Plato, and 
in some measure the Cynics also, placed the 
-summum bonum in the attainment, by means 
of dialectics, of the abstract idea of the good, 
the Cyrenaics placed it in the collection of the 
greatest number of agreeable perceptions, and 
the true philosopher, according to them, was 
one who actively, methodically, and success- 
fully carried on the pursuit of pleasure. Con- 
sequently, as agreeable perceptions were con- 
tinually to be soiight as good and the con- 
trary to be avoided as bad in themselves, per- 
ceptions of sensible objects became the cri- 
terion of all knowledge and the object of all 
action, and therefore truth both theoretical 
and practical. The chief successors of Aris- 
tippus were Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anni- 
ceris. Theodorus perceived the necessity for 
s'oin;e principle, in addition to the mere col- 



— 120 — 

lection of agreeable sensations; for without 
some effort of the understanding to determine 
which of many gratifications was to be pre- 
ferred, it would be impossible, he thought, to 
obtain the miaximum ol gratification ; and he 
therefore set understanding over the senses 
as a regulating and restraining faculty. He 
is said to have been banished from Athens for 
denying the existence of the gods. Hegesias, 
following in the steps of Theodorus, insisted 
still more than he did upon the inadequacy 
of the senses as the criteria of the desirable, 
and at last even went so far as to assert that 
nothing was in itself either agreeable or the 
contrary, and that life and everything in life 
should be a matter of indifference to the wise 
man. In this assertion of the principle of in- 
difference he made an approach to the doc- 
trines of Epicurus and the Stoics in the point 
in which these two opposite systems met. 
Cicero tells us that his book caused so many 
suicides that he was forbidden by one of the 
Ptolemies to lecture on the worthlessness of 
life. In the philosophy of Anniceris and his 
followers the original principles of the Cyre- 
naics were quite lost, and though he also, In a 



121 



popular way recommended the pursuit of the 
agreeable, he denied that it depended in any 
way upon mere sensible impressions, for that 
the wise man might be happy in spite of all 
annoyances ; that friendship was to be sought, 
not for the sake of any immediate advantage 
to be derived from it, but on account of the 
good-will which it generateci; and that for 
a friend's sake a man should encounter even 
annoyances and troubles. These are the doc- 
trines of a mere popular morality, and can 
hardly be ascribed to one school more than to 
any other. It will be remiarked by every one 
that the original tenets of this school were 
very similar to those of Epicurus; indeed, 
with the exception ol the atomic system 
which he borrowed from Democritus and 
Leucippus, the two systems differed only in 
this : the Cyrenaics placed the great object of 
man in the positive and active pursuit of the 
agreeable, while Epicurus made it consist in a 
perfect rest of mind and in freedom from pain ; 
for he considered the agreeable as something 
merely negative, as the pleasing harmony pro- 
duced by exemption fromi -all passion and ap- 
petite. The philosophy of Epicurus may 



therefore be considered as the successor, in 
one point of view, of the system of Aristip- 
pus. 



WORSHIP. 

Whether any savage tribes exist virith no 
behef in any being higher than man, is doubt- 
ful. Burton and Sir John Lubbock are of 
opinion, as was Mr. Darwin, that there have 
been, and still are such tribes; Dr. Tylor, 
after explaining away some alleged cases, ex- 
presses doubt of those remaining. Lubbock 
thus arranges the first great stages in religious 
thought: Atheism, understanding by this 
term, not a denial of the existence of a Deity, 
but an absence of any definite ideas on the 
subject. Fetichism, the stage in which man 
supposes he can force the Deity to comply 
with his desires. Nature-worship or Totem- 
ism, in which natural objects, trees, lakes, 
stones, animals, &c., are worshipped. Sha- 
manism, in which the superior deities are far 
more powerful than man, and of a dififerent 
nature. Their place of abode also is far away, 



123 — 

and accessible only to Shamans. Idolatry or 
Anthropomorphism, in which the gods take 
still more completely the nature of men, be- 
ing, however, more powerful. They are still 
amenable to persuasion; they are a part ol 
nature, and not creatures. They are repre- 
sented by images or idols. In the next stage, 
the Deity is regarded as the author, not 
merely a part of nature. He becomes for the 
first time a really supernatural being. The 
last stage is that in which morahty is asso- 
ciated with religion. 



FATALISM. 

This term is used to express an article of 
philosophical religion, and usually signifies 
that the successive actions of mankind, and 
even the successive operations of the powers 
of nature, are under the guidance of some su- 
perior almighty power, so that these success- 
ions and the actions themselves are entirely 
independent of each other. This doctrine has 
been embodied in all religious systems, 
though very different names have been given 



—^124 — 

to the governing power. The Greeks called 
it moira or ananke, and the Romans called it 
fate; their mythology also mentions a Demi- 
urgus, who had formed the gods. All the 
ancient religions of Asia recognize a similar 
fate, something mightier than the gods, to 
whom it dictates laws; such, for example, as 
the alternating governments of Ormuzd and 
Ahrimanes in the Persian mythology, &c. 
Among the Hebrews the Pharisees were fatal- 
ists, the Sadducees materialists, and the Es- 
senes deists. The old Germanic religion of 
Odin modified this fate, and brought it nearer 
to the idea of the government of the world by 
a deity, identifying it with their highest god, 
whose name was not to be pronounced. From 
this point fate changes to what is called pre- 
destination (in opposition to chance), which 
idea is only a mitigated fate, distinguished, 
however, from genuine fataHsm in proceeding 
directly from God, and not from fate. This be- 
lief in predestination was taught by Moham- 
med, and his followers have retained it. Ro- 
man Catholicism has no trace of this doctrine, 
but it is held by the Calvinists, and to a certain 
extent at least by the church of England. 



— 125 — 

The doctrine of fatalism, as is well known, 
has been frequently and effectively used by 
both ancient and modern poets. 

Intimately related to fatalism is the doc- 
trine of the immediate and direct intervention 
of Providence in the government of the world. 
According to this doctrine the consequences 
of the actions of mankind depend wholly upon 
the actions themselves ; God, however, is able 
so to conduct these consequences, that col- 
lectively they shall result in good, and con- 
formably to His purpose. To comprehend 
this working precisely is impossible for man, 
since his mental powers are not sufficiently 
extensive, and this dogma must therefore be 
a matter of faith. This doctrine is held by 
many Christian sects, and in the Bible there 
are passages strongly in favor of such special 
intervention; for example, Matthew X. 29, 
"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? 
and one of them shall not fall on the ground 
without your Father." 

The third or deistical interpretation ol this 
doctrine teaches the complete non-interven- 
tion of the Deity in the affairs of the world or 
of mankind : we may also call this doctrine the 



126 

doctrine of theological chance, which may 
still be consistent with that of physical neces- 
sity, according to Kant. The doctrine of phys- 
ical necessity was advocated by Hobbes, and 
served for the foundation ol the charges 
against him of deism and atheism. 

If we consider these doctrines in a philo- 
sophical point of view we may come to the fol- 
lowing results: — The theological theories of 
fatalism, predestination, the immediate gov- 
ernment oi God, and his non-intervention, 
evidently bear an analogical relation to the 
political systems of despotism, constitutional 
monarchy, and republicanism. Accordingly 
as every one may have grounds for being an 
adherent of one of these political systems, so 
may he also have grounds for being a follower 
of one of these theological views. Accord- 
ing to the ideas and investigations of the au- 
thor of this article, God may have positively 
fixed, before any creation of the world, the 
eternal ideas, or the relation of things to each 
other within the circle of which nature and 
human intelligence have to move. These 
ideas are (i) for nature, self-preservation, or 
continuance, of which the product is attrac- 



127 — 

tion, &c. ; regularity, producing crystalliza- 
tion, &c. ; and adaptation to purposes, produc- 
ing organization, &c. ; (2) for human intelli- 
gence, self-love, beauty, and virtue. In so far 
as nature and humanity with all their efforts 
cannot move out of this sphere of ideas, so far 
fatalism and predestination exist. The efforts 
of nature to adapt means to ends, and the en- 
deavors of the wise after virtue (or human 
happiness) appear to produce an ever increas- 
ing progression, and in this sense they consti- 
tute an intervention of Providence — since na- 
ture being wholly bound, and God absolutely 
uncontrolled, man stands between both; so 
that though he is not absolutely free, yet he is 
free to work his ultimate ends out of himself ; 
he is free whenever he acts morally, and he is 
not free whenever he acts immorally (or 
rather physically), and he may thus arrive at 
the consciousness that his state in another 
world entirely depends on himself. With this 
conviction every species of intervention would 
appear less harsh towards him, and without 
these grounds he may be doubtful whether 
any direct intervention exists with respect to 
worldly affairs. 



128 



NECESSITY. 



Necessity, according to the common defini- 
tion is that quality of a thing by which it can- 
not but be, or whereby it cannot be other- 
wise. When, in a proposition which affirms 
any thing to be true, there is a fixed invari- 
able connection between the subject and the 
predicate, then that thing is understood to 
be necessary. Necessity is opposed to chance, 
accident, contingency, and to whatever in- 
volves the idea of uncertainty and of possible 
variation. It is usually distinguished into log- 
ical, physical and moral necessity. Logical 
necessity consists in the circumstance that the 
conception of something being different from 
what it is, implies a contradiction or absurd- 
ity. In this sense it is necessary that two and 
two should be four, that converging lines, if 
produced far enough, should meet; thus also 
the eternal existence of being generally is nec- 
essary, as are innumerable other truths. Phys- 
ical necessity has its origin in the established 
order and laws of the material universe. The 



necessity, In tKis case, differs from that for- 
merly specified, in that it is only conditional, 
is a necessity of consequence. Ever5^hing 
that takes place in the natural world happens 
by virtue of certain laws: these laws are 
known by experience to operate regularly and 
uniformly; and the results of their operation 
are hence, with reference to them, said to be 
necessary. When we ascribe anything to 
chance, we merely state our ignorance of the 
law or laws to which its existence is to be re- 
ferred. Physical necessity is founded on the 
relation of cause and effect. By tracing back 
this connection, we arrive at the knowledge 
of a great first cause, that is God, who Is the 
only Being existing independently and by an 
absolute necessity. His infinity and other at- 
tributes are necessary; and it is evident that 
the purposes and acts of such a Being must 
also be necessary, being determined by that 
necessity by which he is what he Is. He must 
always resolve and act with the most perfect 
wisdom, justice and goodness. To affirm the 
contrary would be to afiirm that he is differ- 
ent from what he Is. Moral necessity has ref- 
erence to the volitions and actions of rational 



— I30 — 

agents, and is intended to express the connec- 
tion between these vohtions and actions, and 
certain moral causes, as inclinations, desires, 
or motives generally. Whether there be any 
connection which, strictly speaking, may be 
termed necessary, between such motives, and 
the resolutions of- the human will, and the 
consequent actions, or whether, independent 
of them, the will has a self-determining power, 
is an inquiry which has largely engaged the 
attention of both philosophers and theolog- 
ians. It is one of great interest, and which 
has an important bearing, on whatever relates 
to man as the subject of a moral government. 
The doctrine of a universal necessity, or fa- 
talism, was maintained by many of the ancient 
philosophers; and formed the characteristic 
tenet of the Stoical school. According to it, 
necessity was to be considered as an inevitable 
and all comprehending principle, to which 
gods as well as men were subject. Everything 
was conceived to exist in a necessary series of 
causes and effects — the whole constitution of 
nature — the modes and circumstances of all 
things without exception — being irresistibly 
and unchangeably determined. Hence the 



— 131 — 

language of Seneca, the elegant expounder of 
the opinions of this sect, in his treatise "On 
Providence:" — "The same necessity^ binds 
both gods and men — Divine as well as human 
affairs proceed onward in an irresistible 
stream — one cause depends upon another — 
effects are produced in an endless series — 
nothing is the offspring of chance." Democ- 
ritus held opinions closely resembling 
the Stoical doctrine of fate; as also Heracli- 
tus, the founder of the sect that went by his 
name. In modern times, the doctrine of ne- 
cessity, especially in regard to the human will, 
has been defended by Hobbes, Leibnitz, 
Priestley, Hume, Kaimes, Hartley, and many 
others. 



FREE WILU. 

The universal language and practice of man- 
kind imply a belief in a kind of free-will. To 
deliberate, to choose, to determine, and to act 
in pursuance of such determination, are ex- 
pressions in every man's mouth, and things 
within every man's ordinary experience, both 



~ 132 — 

of himself and others. Every man also sup- 
poses that another will choose and determine 
pretty much in the same way that he himself 
would under the same external circumstances ; 
that is, each man believes that every other 
man will be governed by motives, or will act 
according to motives, in the main pretty 
much as he would himself. When men act dif- 
ferently under the same external circum- 
stances, the cause of the difference in conduct 
is not referred to the circumstances, in which 
it is here supposed that there is no difference, 
but to some difference in the persons. We 
beheve, therefore, that circumstances move 
men to act, but that we have at least a certain 
power of weighing these various motives and 
giving the preponderance to one or another, 
and that different men possess and exercise 
this power in different degrees. This may be 
called, in a sense, a free exercise of the will, 
and every man, at least who is of sound mind, 
believes that he has this power, and is sup- 
posed by others to have it. 

The belief that man possesses this power is 
the foundation o^f laws which forbid acts under 
certain penalties. All legislators have be- 



— 133 — 

lieved that the knowledge that a certain pun- 
-ishment will follow a certain act if detected, 
operates in some degree on those who are 
disposed to do the forbidden, act ; that the 
persons who are by any motives led towards 
such act may, and as a general rule will, de- 
liberate on the penalty attached to the act 
before they do it, and will often be prevented 
from doing it by a comparison of the advant- 
age which they expect to derive from the act, 
with the certain penalty attached to it. Many 
persons do not violate the law because they 
have been brought up in habits of uniform 
obedience to it, and therefore the penalties of 
the law have little or no effect upon their con- 
duct; but it will hardly be disputed that the 
fear of punishment has some effect on many 
men, and is a motive which, operating on the 
mind and operated upon by the mind, pro- 
duces self-restraint. The enactment of penal 
laws supposes a power in men to determine 
how they will act ; or, in other words, it sup- 
poses at least that motives can be presented 
to men which shall in some way and in some 
degree determine their conduct. 

That men, then, do act under the influence 



— 134 — 

oi motives, and that they have also the power 
of weighing motives, is universally admitted, 
and for all practical purposes it is immaterial 
to inquire any further. A man subjects him- 
self to a certain discipline, he educates his 
children in a certain method, and legislators 
forbid men to do a variety of acts, — all acting 
under the belief that the discipHne, the edu- 
cation, and the rules of law are so many mo- 
tives, which, by constantly operating on the 
mind, will produce on the whole a certain line 
of conduct in those who are the objects of 
them. 

But it has been already said, that the ex- 
ternal circumstances or the motives being the 
same, two persons will often act differently 
under them. As the external motives are by 
the supposition the same, there is some dif- 
ference in the persons which causes the dif- 
ference of conduct. Under the same external 
circumstances, one man will violate the law, 
and another will not ; one will steal and rob, 
and commit murder, and another will not. 
It is generally said that the transgressor of 
the law is punished on the supposition that 
his act is voluntary ; that he could, if he chose, 



— 135 — 

have acted differently. Practically, he who 
executes the law will not trouble himself with 
the question whether a particular individual 
could have acted differently under the circum- 
stances : if it is shown that sucE a person pos- 
sessed the ordinary understanding of man- 
kind, he will see no reason for remitting the 
punishment; because he believes that in most 
cases, if not in all, the penalty attached to a 
particular act will operate to deter people 
from doing it. The question of an absolute 
free-will, then, does not concern a legislator. 
It is enough for him to present the proper mo- 
tives for acting or not acting in certain ways, 
if he believes that such motives will on the 
whole produce the conduct which he requires. 
Nor does the question of absolute free-will 
concern any other person who has to direct 
or operate upon others. If he believes that 
he can place such circumstances around per- 
sons, or present to them such motives, as will 
cause a determinate course of action, it is un- 
important whether he believes that the course 
of action is necessarily determined by these 
circumstances, or by these concurring with 
other circumstances, or that the persons who 



— 136 — 

are under their influence do in some way or 
other choose and determine to act as he 
wishes them to act. 

But if we examine more closely any par- 
ticular act of a man's life, suppose it to be an 
act which has about it all the marks of slow 
deliberation, in what sense can we say that 
this is an act of absolute free-will? The or- 
dinary language of mankind assumes the ex- 
istence of choice, — deliberation, — and yet it 
does not permit us to maintain that every act 
is an act of absolute free-will. If it is a vir- 
tuous act, we do not barely ascribe it to a 
man's careful consideration of all the motives 
which at the time operated on him ; we speak 
of his habits, his education, his character, as 
the things which would ensure his acting on 
a given occasion in a determinate way, or, if 
we so choose to express it, as securing that 
exercise of the will which is called a proper ex- 
ercise. And we make the like remarks of a 
man who has deliberately done a bad act. In 
both cases we do not attribute the whole con- 
duct of the man, nor yet the greater part of it, 
to his then determination. We refer to ante- 
cedent circumstances as co-operating to this 



— 137 — 

determination. This is the language of all 
mankind; and the language of all mankind, 
when rightly analyzed, is the true exponent 
of universal opinion. Confused and perplexed 
as it often is, it contains within it implicity the 
elements of all philosophy. Now, when we 
once refer to antecedent circumstances as 
affecting our determination under the motives 
that are presented on any one occasion, we 
give up the theory oi an absolute free-will, 
for we make every act of will depend, in some 
degree at least, on something prior; and that 
something, again, must by the like reasoning 
depend on something prior to it; and thus 
we have an infinite chain of events, and con- 
sequently we find ourselves engaged in an in- 
quiry which is beyond the reach of O'ur ca- 
pacity. Thus, if, as Hartley says, "by free- 
will be meant a power of beginning motion," 
no person can, consistently with his own or- 
dinary language and that of others, maintain 
this proposition; if he does, he will contra- 
dict himself almost as often as he speaks. 

Human actions, then,- are, in some degree 
at least, subject to the same general laws to 
which other events are subject. Every hu- 



-138- 

man action has its antecedents, on which it in 
some degree depends ; but whether every hu- 
man action is as necessary, in the sense in 
which Hume explains the term necessary, as 
the other phenomena which we see, is pre- 
cisely the matter in dispute. (Hume, Essays, 
"Of Liberty and Necessity.") 

When it is said that every event and every 
human action has its antecedent on which it 
depends, it must not be understood that it is 
meant, here at least, to maintain anything else 
than this. Such antecedents are events which, 
according to our experience precede the 
given event uniformly, or at least 
with sufficient uniformity to generate 
in our minds the notion of a certain 
order or continuity ; for though any given an- 
tecedent event is called the cause of any event 
which uniformly follows it in our ordinary 
mode of speech, we here mean to express 
nothing more than the fact of this uniform 
sequence. The utmost that we can say is, 
that the antecedent event is, according to the 
constitution of the universe as known tO' us, 
a necessary condition to the subsequent event. 
Neither heat, nor moisture, nor anything else 



— 139 — 

that we can name, is the cause or a cause of a 
seed vegetating and producing a plant Hke 
that from which it came. Heat and other 
things are conditions of vegetation as known 
to us. The efficient cause can only be one, 
which must be perpetual, and beyond which 
we seek for no other. This efficient cause is 
no law of nature, a term which is incapable 
of all strict analysis. It is the will of God to 
those who admit the existence and omnipo- 
tence of the Deity. To those who do not, if 
there be such, it is something which has never 
yet been explained. 

Now all human actions have their ante- 
cedents, without which, according to our ex- 
perience, they could not be, it follows that 
there are certain antecedents of every action 
which are its conditions, without which such 
action would never be. This cannot be de- 
nied. It is the ordinary language of mankind 
expressed in a different form. But still it is 
perfectly consistent with this to speak of man 
exercising his will, that is, operating on the 
motives which are presented to him. On any 
given occasion man is subjected to various 
momenta, and it may be admitted that each 



— 140 — 

man will be directed by that which to him at 
the time is the strongest. But if a power of 
estimating different motives be admitted to 
exist in the mind, and to exist in different 
men in different degrees, the strength of the 
motive is not its own strength acting on the 
passive mind; it is the activity of the mind 
which according to its power comprehends 
the motive completely or incompletely. 

If the analogy is sound between human ac- 
tions and other phenomena, and if in other 
phenomena the antecedents or conditions are 
not causes, so neither are the antecedents or 
conditions of human actions to be viewed as 
their causes. Man is constantly subjected to 
various momenta, motives, or circumstances, 
as they are often called, without which he 
would not act as he does act. These momenta 
are traced back by an infinite series to the first 
cause of all, just as in the bare physical phe- 
nomena, if we trace them far enough, we must 
ascend to a first cause. If the analogy then is 
complete between man's acts and other phe- 
nomena, the operation of all these compli- 
cated conditions in some way determines the 
acts of man ; but how it determines them we 



— 141 — 

cannot tell. There is no person who main- 
tains the doctrine of absolute free-will who 
will contend that man can set his will in oppo- 
sition to that of God. It is possible to con- 
ceive that God does will to let man have free 
action within certain limits, but not further; 
and all our forms of speech do either expressly 
or by implication admit that our will is free 
to a certain extent, which we cannot exactly 
define, but that it is not absolutely free. It 
may be objected that to deny an absolute free- 
will destroys the distinction between actions ; 
that it represents the Deity as the cause of 
vice and misery. But even if it should be so, 
that will not prove a thing to be false which is 
established by the sound exercise of our un- 
derstanding. No such consequence, however, 
does follow. To God we attribute the origin 
of everything; and consistently with this we 
must say that he permits vice and misery to 
exist in the world. It is a consequence of 
man's nature as he is constituted, and under 
the circumstances in which he is placed, that 
he has acted and does act in such a way as to 
cause misery to himself and others. 

It must therefore be assumed that man is 



— 142 — 

so constituted that he does not always act in 
the way that is most consistent with his own 
happiness and the happiness of others. The 
vicious conduct of many men in hfe is an ob- 
ject of disapprobation to others, and in all 
societies that conduct which is injurious to the 
existence O'f such societies is visited with pen- 
alties. Thus a vast majority of mankind see 
that certain acts are injurious to the general 
happiness, and it is one main object of so- 
ciety to prevent such acts. As God permits 
society to exist, we m'ay assume that he wills 
it to exist, and that he wills generally the 
means by which society attempts to secure 
its own existence. It is a consequence of this 
that he disapproves of the conduct of those 
whose acts endanger the existence of society. 
We cannot say that he does not will it : it ex- 
ists, and therefore is consistent with his gen- 
eral will. We are compelled therefore to ap- 
ply to him by analogy such terms as are ap- 
plicable only to our own limited capacities: 
and we say that he wills generally that all 
things shall be as they are, but that he disap- 
proves of some. That he permits man so 
much liberty of action as to render it neces- 



— 143 — 

sary for society to be vigilant against the evil 
doers who wo'uld disturb its repose, is no more 
an imputation upon his goodness than that he 
permits fire, tempest, and war and pestilence 
and famine to thin the numbers of mankind. 
So far as concerns those who suffer, it is the 
same thing whether they suffer from the hand 
of man, or from causes over which he has no 
control. It is consistent with all experience to 
say the Deity has willed that man shall suffer 
pain both through the agency of matter and 
through the agency of his fellow-men. Now 
if we shall assume that God only wills our hap- 
piness in the sense in which many persons un- 
derstand it — which would, according to their, 
notions, exclude all pain and suffering — what- 
ever misery happens through man's miscon- 
duct must be against his general will, and can 
only result from man having an absolute free- 
will, and sometimes exercising it in a way 
different from the Deity's wishes. There is 
no evading this difficulty. An absolute free- 
will in man or in any other being is inconsist- 
ent with the omnipotence of the Deity, and it 
is, as already shown, contradicted by all our 
observation of the mode in which man is oper- 



— 144 — 

ated upon by motives and cifctimstances. 
But there is nothing which prevents us from 
attributing to man, as we do' in our daily ex- 
pressions, a power of determining his acts, 
under given circumstances, in one direction 
rather than in another, and in a wrong in pref- 
erence to a right direction. And it is further 
admitted by the universal language of man- 
kind, that the same man who acted wrong un- 
der one set of motives, might and would have 
acted right if he had been influenced by other 
motives; and these motives to right action, 
it is also admitted, may be and frequently are 
external circumstances over which he has no 
control. It is true that a man may so disci- 
pline himself, that, in any given circumstances 
which may arise, he may have motives at his 
command which shall enable him to act in the 
right direction. But if some men can do this, 
all cannot; and even in the case of him who 
can do it, we may always trace the origin of 
this power to some external circumstances 
over which he had no control. Man's will 
then is circumscribed by the constitution of 
things, of which he is a part. He is placed in 
circumstances in which he is operated upon 



— 145 — 

by various motives to action. If it is said that 
he must be determined absolutely by that 
which is the most powerful, this is only an- 
other mode of saying that of various forces 
tending to make him move, the strongest will 
carry him in its own direction. But in truth 
the words force, motive, and others O'f a like 
kind, are apt to lead us to false analogies : and 
these terms require explanation. 

Every man believes at the time when he acts 
with deliberation that he has a capacity for 
exercising a free-will. But he also knows 
that circumstances may prevent deliberation. 
Thus it is a common case for a man to allege 
that if he had not been alarmed or hurried, he 
would have acted differently; or in other 
words, he would have been enabled to de- 
liberate and decide better. No man considers 
it to be a case where the will is properly con- 
cerned when his action is thus impeded. And 
there are numerous like cases in life in which 
in fact there is no choice or deliberation, and 
consequently no real exercise of the will. The 
power, then, whatever it may be, to deliberate 
and act, is often suspended or not exercised. 
In most cases we act from habit in the gen- 



— 146 — 

eral course of life, in other cases from impulse ; 
and when we act from impulse, there is no 
deliberation or determinate will. It appears 
then that our will is not always exercised 
when we act, but that when it is exercised we 
are conscious of a capacity to weigh deliber- 
ately the various motives or grounds of action 
as presented by our own mental activity. 
Now if we say that the strongest motive thus 
presented must prevail and determine to ac- 
tion, we may, as above observed, be misled 
by a false analogy. The motive may be called 
a moving power; and if so, it must have its 
effect : but to deny the mind all power in itself 
to resist the motive, is the same thing as to 
consider it an inert mass operated upon solely 
by an external force. It is the same thing as 
to make the mind of man a recipient o^f sensu- 
ous phenomena without any power to operate 
on them. The systems of philosophy which 
view the mind as such a recipient will be con- 
sistent in making it yield to the strongest 
motive without an effort of its own. Those 
systems which assign to the mind a power of 
operating on impressions may consistently ad- 
mit a power of determining which of them it 
will obey. 



— 147 



IDEAL. 



Ideal has two uses, philosophical and criti- 
cal. In the former it sig-nifies, first, whatever 
belongs or relates to ideas generally. It is in 
this sense that the word is employed in the 
phrase "Ideal theory," in the controversy be- 
tween Reid and Priestley. According to this 
theory, the understanding does not perceive 
external objects themselves by means of the 
sensuous organs, but the organs of sight and 
touch transmit to the mind certain ideas or 
images of sensible objects, which it perceives 
within itself. Locke, who received the term 
idea from Descartes, seems unconsciously to 
have adopted, with the use of the word, the 
scholastic doctrine which it involved. For he 
expressly declares that our ideas of the pri- 
mary qualities of bodies are resemblances of 
them, but that those produced by secondary 
qualities are no resemblances at all. From 
this explanation of the means of perception, 
Locke has, on the one hand, been represented 
as the origin of modern idealism ; while on the 



— 148 — 

other, in consequence of the superior value 
which he evidently gives to the testimony of 
sensation, his authority has been claimed by 
the opposite school of ideology, as founded by 
the disciples of his French commentator Con- 
dillac. The second sense of the word is more 
limited, being confined to a peculiar class of 
ideas created by and solely subsisting in the 
imagination. Connected with this especial 
signification in its usage in the science of criti- 
cism, or aesthetics. Here ideal signifies a 
something which, although not existing 
in the reality of sensible things, subsists actu- 
ally in thought — the joint creation of the rea- 
son and the imagination, the archetype and 
pattern of supreme and perfect beauty. Al- 
though unreal in nature, this ideal is not un- 
natural; it is the absolute sum and unity of 
those scattered beauties which nature, with a 
lavish but impartial hand, has diffused among 
her myriad phenomena. 



149 



IDEALISM. 

Idealism, the designation of many and dif- 
ferent systems of philosophy, which only 
agree in the common principle from which 
they originate. This principle is the opposi- 
tion of the ideal and the real, that is, of ideas 
and things — the contrariety of mind and 
body, or of spirit and matter. 

I. As the essence of the mental lies in free 
activity and vital motion, as opposed to the 
invariable mechanism and inertness of the cor- 
poreal, the name of Idealism is rightly applied 
to those systems of physiology which make 
the primal substance and original of all things 
to be certain forces invisibly working 
throughout the universe. To the idealists of 
this class belong the dynamical philosophers 
of the Ionian school, Thales, Anaximenes, 
Diogenes of Apollonia, and Heraclitus. 

The fundamental position of their several 
doctrines was the assumption of a living 
energy which as it develops itself undergoes 
continuous alteration both of form and quality 



— I50 — 

— a transmutation which is the cause 'of all 
generation in nature. For water, the primary 
substance of Thales, was not the simple ele- 
ment, but water pregnant with vitality; the 
infinite air of Anaximenes was an animated 
and animating energy; and the intellectual 
primary of Diogenes was not merely the at- 
mospheric air, but a warm and perfect breath 
of life which pervades and ensouls the uni- 
verse. While, however, in these philosophers 
the philosophical idea is more or less mixed up 
with divers sensible conceptions, Heraclitus 
seems clearly conscious of speaking figura- 
tively of the primary substance. With him a 
universal and absolute life is the cause of all 
phenomena, which indeed is most strongly 
and openly manifested in the vitality of fire 
and the rational soul, which is like to fire, 
while in other phenomena it is inherent, al- 
though not so obvious and immediately cog- 
nizable. In this class of idealists among mod- 
erns we must reckon Boscovich and Leibnitz. 
The former explained matter to be a system of 
forces; while, according to the latter, all be- 
ings are of the same nature. Activity and sim- 
plicity are the essential characters of all, and 



— 151 — 

are so many forces or causes which he terms 
monads. All these monads possess the fac- 
ulty of perception, or of reflecting within 
themselves, as in a mirror, the universe. 
These images, however, of perception cannot 
become the objects of knowledge, unless in 
these monads, which possess also what Leib- 
nitz calls apperception, by which they are en- 
abled to distinguish and see in themselves 
these images. It is therefore this faculty of 
apperception which constitutes the difference 
between the so-called material and spiritual; 
and as the faculty itself admits of different 
degrees, there are corresponding orders of in- 
telHgences. Lastly, we must include in this 
class, if anywhere among the idealists, the sys- 
tem of Spinoza, who asserts the identity of 
matter and spirit, making them to be but dif- 
ferent aspects of one and the same substance ; 
and Schelling, whose philosophy may be re- 
garded as the complement of that of the Jew- 
ish philosopher. 

2. Another species of idealism considers the 
real as simply ideal, and assumes that our rep- 
resentations of a material world correspond to 
nothing actually existing, but that by conteni- 



— 152 — 

plating these as objective, we transmute the 
merely ideal into the real. The fundamental 
axiom of this idealism is the priority of the 
ideal and the subsequence of the real ("ideale 
prius, reale posterius"). Accordingly, the real 
only exists so far as it is necessarily conceived 
by us, so that the external world is purely a 
creation of our conceptions, or, in other 
words, the real is a product of the ideal. To 
this class is referred the Platonic attempt to 
account for the existence of the sensible world 
by his ideas alonejwithout recourse to any 
other nature alien and foreign to them. By 
some, even the Aristotelian philosophy is des- 
ignated as ideal in this sense, at least so far 
as regards its fundamental principle. This 
they make to be the assumption of a uni- 
versal mundane intelligence which, as the 
principle of all things is a force, self-active, all- 
perfect, and absolutely free. The manifold 
manifestations of this entelechy are forms be- 
fore and beside which matter exists only po- 
tentially, while the forms are determined and 
distinguished by privation. But the most per- 
fect of idealists in this class is Fichte, who 
derives not merely the form, but also the mat- 



— 153 — 

ter, of the conception of external things out 
of the mind itself, or, in his terminology, out 
of the ego. 

3. A third system of idealism proceeds to 
the absolute denial of all material existences. 
This species of idealism was impossible among 
the ancients, who did not oppose mind so 
sharply to matter as to deny the possibility of 
their interaction, but tacitly supposed their 
similarity, opposing only corporeity, as com- 
posite, to incorporeity, as simple. Of this 
idealism Bishop Berkeley is the author, al- 
though Descartes gave occasion to it by his 
position, that nothing extended can enter the 
unextended soul. Arthur Collier maintained 
the same theory, by a different line of argu- 
ment, and Locke afforded, by his doctrine of 
ideas, the arguments for its support. The sys- 
tem of Berkeley is briefly this: matter does 
not exist independently of our sensations, but 
conceptions of a material world are produced 
by the operation of the Deity upon our under- 
standing, and the material world exists only 
in the divine intellect, who awakes in us cer- 
tain sensuous conceptions in a definite order, 



— 154 — 

which order is what we call the course of na- 
ture. 

4. The last species of idealism is more phil- 
osophical, and, without denying or asserting 
the existence of a material world, is content 
with confessing an ignorance of its nature. It 
pretends not to a knowledge of things them- 
selves, but is content with employing the ideas 
which the mind forms, according to the laws 
of its own nature, upon the occasion of the 
excitement of its sensuous organs, without de- 
termining whether these ideas correspond or 
not to the exciting cause or causes, whatever 
they may be. To this class belong Male- 
branche and Kant. According to the former, 
mind and matter cannot act upon each other, 
and the sensations of the mind are so many 
occasional causes operating by a constant mir- 
acle of divine agency. According to the lat- 
ter, all that we know of outward objects is 
that they furnish the material part of our con- 
ceptions, to which the mind furnishes the form 
agreeably to its original and connatural laws ; 
while of things themselves, which he calls 
phenomena, we absolutely know nothing, but 



— 155 — 

note only the modes under which they appear 
to us. 

IdeaHsm in fact forms the antithesis to real- 
ism, which involves materialism. Sir William 
Hamilton in his "Lectures on Metaphysics" 
says — "a philosophical system is often pre- 
vented from falling into absolute idealism or 
absolute materialism, and held in a kind of 
oscillating equilibrium, not in consequence of 
being based on the fact of consciousness, but 
from the circumstance that its materialistic 
tendency in one opinion happens to be coun- 
teracted by its idealistic tendency in another; 
two opposite errors in short, co-operating to 
the same result as one truth. On this ground 
is to be explained why the philosophy of 
Locke and Condillac did not more easily slide 
into materialism." (Lecture xvi.) He also 
observes that "mankind in general believe 
that an external world exists, only because 
they believe that they immediately know it as 
existent." But of course if this knowledge be 
disallowed, if the perception be only existent 
in the mind, the conclusion would be un- 
founded. 



156 ~ 



OPTIMISM. 

The name given to the view propounded in 
the Theodicee of Leibnitz that this world, as 
the work of God, must be the best among all 
possible worlds ; for, were a better world pos- 
sible than that which actually exists, God's 
wisdom must have known, His goodness must 
have willed, and His omnipotence must have 
created it. Leibnitz maintained that, if there 
was to be a world, it must consist of finite 
beings; this is the justification of finiteness 
and liability to suffering, or metaphysical evil ; 
that physical evil, or pain, is salutary as pun- 
ishment, or means of tuition; and that God 
could not remove moral evil, or wrong, with- 
out removing the power of self-determination, 
and, therewith, the possibility of morality it- 
self. J. S. Mill (Three Essays upon Religion, 
p. 40) points out that Leibnitz did not main- 
tain that this is the best of all conceivable, 
but of all possible, worlds, so that his doctrine 
(though not that of his caricature, Pangloss) 
might be held by a "limited" Theist. 



157 



UTILITARIANISM. 

A word coined by J. Stuart Mill to denote 
that system which makes the happiness of 
mankind the criterion of right. It is thus 
more extensive than Epicureanism, which 
constituted personal happiness a criterion for 
the individual, leaving the happiness of oth- 
ers out of the question. The system owes its 
origin to Bentham (1748- 1832), was attacked 
by Macaulay in the Edinburgh Review, and is 
thus defined by J. S. Mill : "The creed which 
accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, 
or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the ab- 
sence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of 
the moral standard set up by the theory much 
more requires to be said; in particular what 
things it includes in the ideas of pain or pleas- 
ure; and to what extent this is left an open 



-158- 

question. But these supplementary explana- 
tions do not affect the theory of life on which 
this theory of morality is grounded — namely, 
that pleasure and freedom from pain are the 
only things desirable as ends ; and that all de- 
sirable things (which are as numerous in the 
utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desir- 
able either for the pleasure inherent in them- 
selves, or as means to the promotion of pleas- 
ure and the prevention of pain," 



NIHILISM. 

A term used in Western Europe to desig- 
nate the Russian Socialist movement, which 
began about 1870, and may be divided into 
two distinct periods: (i) "The going among 
the peasants." A number of young men and 
young women of the upper classes voluntarily 
went to work in the fields and the factories 
so as personally to carry on a Socialist propa- 
ganda and distribute Socialist literature. 
Their organs were the Yperiod (Forward !) of 
London and the Workman of Geneva. This 
lasted about six years, during which time 



— 159 — 

there were twenty-three political trials of 417 
persons, half of whom were condemned to ex- 
ile in Siberia or to hard labor in the mines. 
(2) In 1878 the struggle with the government 
commenced. At a congress held at Lipezk, 
shortly after Soloviefif's attempt on the life of 
Alexander II., the acquisition of political free- 
dom was declared to be the first necessity. It 
was hoped to gain this by the formation of a 
legislative body, elected by the people, with 
guarantees for electoral independence, and 
liberty to agitate for reforms. This was de- 
manded from Alexander III. shortly after the 
assassination of the late Emperor as the price 
of cessation from violence. The Nihilist pro- 
gramme is an agrarian socialism based on 
communal property. The discoveries of the 
police show that Nihilism is widely spread in 
Russia, not only among the working, but 
among the well-to-do classes, and even in the 
army, especially in Petersburg, and in many 
of the principal cities and towns. 



— i6o — 



SOCIALISM. 



The word Socialism is employed in sevcial 
different senses. Loosely, it includes all 
schemes for abolishing social inequality, and 
in this sense it is generally distinguished as 
Utopian Socialism, under which designation 
communities like those of the Essenes, the 
early Christians, and the Shakers in America 
at the present day, and the ideal common- 
wealths of Plato, More, and Harrington, are 
to be classed. St. Simon (1760- 1825), Owen 
(i 771-1858), and Fourier (1768- 1830) were 
the leading modern Utopians. Scientific So- 
cialism is an economic theory which affirms 
that the materials from which labor produces 
wealth — i. e., the land — should be the prop- 
erty of the community, not of the individuals 
forming a separate class. Socialists also de- 
mand that the existing capital, having (as they 
contend) been unjustly appropriated by the 
landholding class or its assignees, be restored, 
with the land, to the community. It vests all 
authority in the hands of delegates elected by 
the community, and seeks to substitute pttblic 
co-operation for private enterprise in supply- 
ing' all social needs. 



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